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NOTES
EFFECT OF NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT ON STATE
INSOLVENCY STATUTES*
PRIOR to 1898, federal bankruptcy laws were short-lived and widely spaced
in time.' Designed primarily to fill the resulting gaps in federal provision
for bankruptcy and to satisfy the needs of insolvent debtors, insolvency laws
of varying types were enacted by the states. But the passage of the National
Act of 1898,2 with its comprehensive scheme for distribution and discharge,
brought with it a large degree of overlapping. These points of conflict have
recently been multiplied in number and importance by the enactment of state
and federal provisions for the reorganization of corporations.8 Through con-
tinued litigation, the essential issue has been reduced to an interpretation of
the Delphic formula that the National Bankruptcy Act "suspends" the opera-
tion of state laws that are "within the field" of the federal statute.
4
Certain generalizations have become accepted. Congress has authority to
establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." 5 In the absence of
any Congressional action, the states are thought to have full power to pass
insolvency laws, subject only to the restrictions of their own and the federal
constitutions.6 Once Congress exercises its power, however, the Federal Act
is said to be paramount in the field it is designed to cover.
7
* First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v. Robinson. 107 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
1. There were three Acts: the Act of 1800, repealed in 1803; the Act of 1841, re-
pealed in 1843; the Act of 1867, repealed in 1878. For discussion of the history of federal
bankruptcy legislation, see CouLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 6-23; WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); NOEL, BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1918).
2. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
3. Statutes of this type have been enacted in Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington and West Virginia.
Several are modelled after § 59 of the Uniform Business Corporation Act. For a discus-
sion of typical provisions, see WILGUs AND HAMILTON, MICHIGAN GENERAL CORPORATION
ACT (1932) 45-68; Levin, Blind Spots in the Present Wisconsin General Corporation
Statute 1939 WIs. L. Rv. 173, 218-220; Hoshour, The Minnesota Business Corpora-
tions Act (1933) 18 MINN. L. REv. 1, 12; Miller, The Illnois Business Corporation Act
and Bankruptcy Legislation (1935) 29 ILL. L. REV. 695; Comment (1939) 52 HARv. L.
REv. 1342.
4. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 613 (1918).
5. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
6. The prohibition in Article I, § 10 of the Federal Constitution against state im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts prevents the application of state insolvency laws
to debts that arise under contracts made outside the state or before the statute was passed.
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827) ; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (U. S.
1863). Under the rule that an existing state statute is written into every contract,
however, the statutes operate effectively on obligations contracted within the state after
the date of passage. Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454 (1892). State power is further lim-
ited by the doctrine that proceedings under a state insolvency law operate only upon prop-
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The concept that federal bankruptcy laws are paramount is clear enough
in cases which authorize bankruptcy courts to take over administrative juris-
diction from courts operating under state law, or from federal equity receiver-
ship courts.8 But the paramount nature of the bankruptcy power is hopelessly
ambiguous when a collateral attack is attempted against a state proceeding
on the ground that the state law authorizing the proceeding is "suspended"
Two theories have struggled for supremacy on the issue of suspension. A
handful of courts have held that state laws are operative, and proceedings
under them effective, so long as a petition is not actually instituted under the
Federal Act.9 But the main current of precedent, sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Company v. Pinkus,'0 has established the rule
that the passage of the Federal Act ipso facto "suspends" the operation of
the state insolvency laws, and permits collateral attack upon all subsequent
proceedings taken under those laws. 1' As a matter of dodtrine, this theory
of automatic suspension holds that the state laws are in abeyance during the
existence of the Federal Act,'2 with the consequence that courts operating
under such laws have no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The view that state laws within the area covered by a National Bankruptcy
Act are without effect has been much tested in connection with the problem
of whether those laws may still be applied to persons not within the scope
of the federal provisions. Some courts refuse to allow the state acts any
operative effect at all, grounding their decisions on the thesis that Congress,
by acting, has indicated its intent to deal with the entire subject, and conse-
quently has preempted the field.1 3 It is alleged, for example, that if Congress
erty within the state, and do not, in general, prevent non-assenting creditors frm levy-
ing on property in another state. Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U. S.
624 (1899) ; Barth v. Back-us, 140 N. Y. 230. 35 N. E. 425 (1S93).
7. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819); Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827).
S. Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342 (1933); Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz,
262 U. S. 640 (1923).
9. In re Scholtz, 106 Fed. 834 (S. D. Iowa 1901); Reed Bros. & Co. v. Taylor,
32 Iowa 209 (1871) ; Friedman & Sons Cloak Co. v. Hogins, 175 Ark. 599, 299 S. W.
997 (1927).
10. 278 U. S. 261 (1929), 29 Cor. L. REv. 519, 42 HARv. L. Rn,. 823, 27 Mica. L.
Rv. 696.
11. In re Hall, 121 Fed. 992 (D. Conn. 1903); Littlefield -. Gay, 96 Me. 422, 52
Atl. 925 (1902) ; for other cases, see 5 REcz. rox o-: BANRurrcY (4th ed. 1931) 2,N,
n. 30.
12. Butler v. Goreley, 146 U. S. 303 (1892) ; see FI.LD, TnE EFr-. or %. U:.iN-
sriTruTioAL STAT=TIT (1935) 287. Theoretically, the effect of the passnge of the federal
law is not to render the state laws entirely void; they are merely held in abeyance, and
revive upon the repeal of the federal law. But, inasmuch as the present Bankruptcy Act
seems destined to become a permanent feature of national legislatinn, the significance of
this distinction fades.
13. In re Hall Co., 121 Fed. 992 (D. Conn. 1903) ; Littlefield v% Gay, 95 "Me. 4" ,
52 Atl. 925 (1902) ; Adrian State Bank v. Klinkhammer, 1M2 Minn. 57, 233 X. W. 53
(1930); see Williston, The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Act Upon State Laws
(1909) 22 HAv. L. REv. 547, 550 et seq.
1940] 1091JVOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
chooses to exempt certain classes from the involuntary provision, or from
both the voluntary and involuntary provisions of the Act,"' application of
state insolvency laws to those individuals or corporations involves a direct
conflict with federal power. But a number of courts have swung over to the
"blind spot" theory. Although recognizing that Congress has the power to
legislate completely and exclusively on the subject of bankruptcies, such
opinions posit that Congress has simply declined to provide for those classes
outside the scope of the Act. Thus, on the assumption that there is no conflict
with the Federal Act, state insolvency laws have been upheld insofar as they
relate to involuntary proceedings against farmers and wage-earners.'rS The
Supreme Court has never passed directly on this perplexing problem of inter-
pretation, although broad and contradictory dicta can be culled from several
opinions which would lead to either result. 16
Numerous -efforts to define the field of the Federal Act have resulted in
an abundance of definitional doctrine- not all of it clear, and none of it
satisfactory. The touchstone most commonly employed to identify a law "on
the subject of bankruptcies" is the presence of a discharge provision. It seems
fairly well established that a discharge clause, if not separable from the rest
of the state act, will require the statute to be classified as an insolvency law
for purposes of collateral attack.l7 It has been argued, nevertheless, that a
discharge is not an inherent part of a bankruptcy law because such a pro-
vision was not included in the early English bankruptcy acts until the Statute
of Anne in 1705.18 But this historical fact alone does not prove that the
word "bankruptcy," as employed in the Federal Constitution, contemplates
an act without such a provision. That such a provision, however, is not the
essence of an insolvency law has been declared by many courts.10 Indeed,
14. Section 4(a) provides that any person, "except a municipal, railroad, insurance,
or banking corporation or a building and loan association," may become a voluntary bank-
rupt. Involuntary petitions against such corporations and associations, as well as against
wage earners, farmers, and persons owing less than $1,000, are prohibited by §4(b).
15. Old Town Bank of Baltimore v. McCormick, 96 Md. 341, 53 AtI. 934 (1903) ;
Hoover v. Ober, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 308 (1910) ; see Williams, The Effect of the Federal
Bankrupt Act Upon State Insolvency Laws (1902) 50 Amt. L. REG. 211. It is probable,
despite these cases, that Congress intended to exempt farmers and wage earners from all
involuntary proceedings. But it would seem difficult to argue that Congress intended that
banks, insurance companies, and building and loan associations should have no means of
orderly liquidation and reorganization. Several states have passed varying laws dealing
with the insolvency and rehabilitation of such corporations and associations. See Penn-
sylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935); Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64 (1935).
16. "States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bank-
ruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations." International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 265 (1929). Compare the statement in Stellwagen v. Clum, 245
U. S. 605, 615 (1918): "It is only state laws which conflict with the bankruptcy laws
of Congress that are suspended; those which are in aid of the Bankruptcy Act can stand."
See also Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120, 126 (1937).
17. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929); In re Tarnowski, 191
Wis. 279, 210 N. W. 836 (1926) ; see Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 385 (1883).
18. GLENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) 210.
19. See, for example, In re Weedman Stave Co., 199 Fed. 948 (E. D. Ark. 1912);
In re Salmon & Salmon, 143 Fed. 395 (W. D. Mo. 1906).
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the invalidity of such a criterion is further indicated by the fact that a statute
with no provision for discharge has been categorized as a bankruptcy law.20
Several criteria might be derived from the language of the opinion in the
Pinkus case. One suggestion is that insolvency in the sense of excess of
liabilities over assets, as the condition precedent to the operation of a statute,
is the identifying characteristic of an insolvency law.2'1 Such a test fails
under the Bankruptcy Act itself, which extends beyond the limits of such
insolvency. Similarly, the test of inclusion of provisions for administration
by a trustee and classification of claims proves too much.m  Such provisions
are contained in any administrative scheme, such as common law general
assignments, which have been held not to be "suspended." 2 The Supreme
Court seemed further to indicate that the issue of suspension of a state law
might depend upon the amount of the claim of the attacking creditor. In
the previous case of Boese v. King,24 the Court had denied a collateral attack
on a general assignment upon the ground that the attacking creditor could
have filed an involuntary petition within the statutory period and secured an
equal administration of the debtor's estate, but instead had chosen to wait
and try to obtain a preference by garnishing the assigned fund. Mr. Justice
Butler distinguished this case chiefly by pointing out that the plaintiff in the
Pinkus action could not by himself have invoked the Bankruptcy Act, inas-
much as his claim was under $500. To judge the operation of a state law by
this criterion is absurd. Moreover, in the subsequent case of Johnson v. Star25
the attacking creditor could not have filed an involuntary petition against the
debtor, and yet was denied a collateral attack.
2
It has been suggested that the presence of a provision in a state statute
permitting involuntary proceedings is the distinguishing characteristic of an
insolvency law.27 Yet the statute invalidated in the Pinkus case contained
only voluntary provisions. 28 Professor Radin has likewise disposed of this
theory by indicating that such a test would encompass non-bankruptcy dis-
tributions made under creditors' bills according to state priority and exemption
statutes.2 9 As a more sophisticated criterion for suspension, he suggests the
20. Miller v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 240 App. Div. 169,
175, 270 N. Y. S. 522, 528 (4th Dep't 1934). The statute involved vas the Bank Con-
servation Act, 48 STAT. 3 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 207 (1934).
21. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus. 278 U. S. 261, 264 (1929).
22. Ibid. See also Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 330 (1931).
23. Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496 (1875).
24. 10S U. S. 379 (1883). This case arose under the Act of 1867, which provided
for a six months statutory period.
25. 287 U. S. 527 (1933).
26. The reference to the fact that the debtor. in the Pinhkus case could have filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy, or that three of his creditors could have invoked the
statute, likewise supplies no solution to the problem of suspension. This power was
equally present in cases in which contrary decisions were reached, and proceedings under
the state statutes ostensibly sanctioned. Probeslo v. Joseph If. Boyd Co., 287 U. S. 518
(1933) ; Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527 (1933).
27. See Note (1933) 8 -%Vss. L. REv. 282.
28. Am DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 91, §§ 7607-7615.
29. Radin, What is a Bankruptcy Law? (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 792.
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test of "coercion of creditors." If the assignee has the power to set aside
liens obtained by creditors prior to the proceedings, then the act granting
that power is an insolvency law, and suspended. But, in Pobreslo v. Joseph
A. Boyd, the Supreme Court upheld an assignment under a statute whose
provisions for recovery of assets and against priority of liens seem to fall
within Professor Radin's category.3 0 As a matter of policy, it would seem
desirable that an assignee under a valid general assignment statute should
have power, for purposes of effective administration, to set aside fraudulent
conveyances. 31
A final test rests upon attempted distinctions between insolvency laws and
statutes or bodies of practice representing results available at common law.
So far the issue has been tested particularly in the case of assignment statutes.
To validate an assignment made under state statute, the technique has been
to classify the arrangement as a voluntary, common law proceeding based
upon contract, and regulated only incidentally by statute for purposes of ad-
ministration of the trust.82 It has further been variously argued that the
general assignment device, having existed side by side at common law with
bankruptcy legislation, is therefore outside the scope of bankruptcy laws;
or that the assignment statute is declaratory of common law and consequently
not in conflict with the Federal Act.8  The dialectic for upsetting a state
arrangement, on the other hand, has been to say that the administration stems
directly from an insolvency statute, and is carried on solely by process of
the court.3 4 But in terms of results, the entire distinction between common
law and statute is too finely drawn.80 That the common law assignment, as
well as the legislative enactment, derives its sanction from the sovereign
authority of the state seems clear.30 That the same objective is being sought,
30. 287 U. S. 518 (1933). Wis. STAT. (1929) §§128:04, 128:05, 128:07, 128:08. For
a discussion of similar sections in other state statutes, see Comment, Statutory Regulation
of Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 944, 956.
31. It would seem equally desirable that a receiver under a state reorganization
statute have such power. See McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140 (1935), where the
Supreme Court allowed a receiver to recover the proceeds of sales of bonds and notes
from the promoters of the corporation, on the ground that these transactions involved a
fraud on creditors. See also Comment (1936) 49 HARV. L. REV. 785.
32. Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U. S. 518 (1933); Johnson v. Star, 287
U. S. 527 (1933) ; In re Sievers. 91 Fed. 366 (E. D. Mo. 1899), aff'd, 92 Fed. 325 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1899). See Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1140.
33. See GENN, LIQUIDATION (1935) 208 et seq.; 5 RE MINGTON ON BANKRUITCY
(1931) 215 et seq.; Comment 1938 Wis. L. Rnv. 302.
34. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929) ; see discussion in Po-
breslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U. S. 518, 525-526 (1933).
35. Corresponding distinctions between administration under a contract of general
assignment and administration under statutes, and between general assignment or re-
ceivership statutes and "insolvency statutes," are taken in conflicts of laws cases, for
various purposes. See STUIMBERG, CONFLicr OF LAWS (1937) 112; Clark v. Williard,
294 U. S. 211 (1935). Compare Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U. S. 624
(1899), with Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co., 109 Ky. 441, 59 S. W. 493
(1900).
36. Some states have two separate statutes for insolvent debtors: one called a gen-
eral assignment law and the other an insolvency statute. Compare, for example, ARK.
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and substantially the same procedure followed in both instances, seems like-
wise dear. It would appear, then, highly arbitrary to ignore the statute and
attach the validating stamp of common law to one proceeding, while per-
mitting collateral attack on the other 3 7 Moreover, the net effect of such a
distinction may be to freeze the common law of the various states in regard
to discharges. The established Texas common law practice of allowing an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, under which they would execute
releases upon receipt of dividends,38 was upheld by the Supreme Court in
John-son v. Star.9 But an attempted assignment plus release in Arkansas -
illegal under Arkansas common law40 -was thrown out in the Pinbus case
on the ground that the statute permitting such discharge was suspended. The
rather anomalous conclusion to be drawn is that Arkansas is denied the power
so to alter its common law rule by statute as to conform with a common law
doctrine of Texas which has been expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
A similar congeries of amorphous and confused doctrine beclouds the prob-
lem of whether state laws for reorganization of corporations are suspended
by the existence of Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Doubtless,
fear of invalidation has cut down resort to these statutes and stunted their
development. In the recent case of First Nalional Bank in Albuqzcrque v.
Robinson,4 ' such fears were justified by an opinion in which it was asserted,
if not held, that a New Mexico statute authorizing the appointment of
DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 91, §§ 7607-7615 and Am. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 9,
§§ 523-530; see Grxxx, LiQuDAT ON (1935) 205. It is difficult to attach much significance
to this difference in terminology, or to find a fundamental distinction between the two
types of statute that would render one in conflict with the National Bankruptcy Act, and
the other not. Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court in the Pidbrus case regarded the
disputed insolvency law and proceedings under it the equivalent, in effect, of a general
assignment. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 173 Ark. 316, 319, -292 S. "V. 996, 993
(1927).
37. The Supreme Court has accepted this rather nebulous distinction between in-
solvency law and general assignment statute in the Pobreslo and Star cases. It has further
indicated that the highest state court's ruling on the type of statute will be controlling.
Johnson v. Star, 287 U. S. 527, 530 (1933). Such an approach might lead to conflicting
results for substantially similar statutes, depending on which label the particular state
court attached to its own statute.
38. Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (1903) ; Patty-joiner &
Eubank Co. v. Cummins, 93 Tex. 598, 57 S. W. 566 (1900).
39. It does not fully appear from the Supreme Court opinion whether there was a
release clause involved in the proceedings in the Star case. Assuming that there was such
a provision, the probable holding in the case is: 1. the statute is valid and fully oper-
ative except for the discharge clause, which is suspended; 2. the release, nevertheless, is
operative because good at common law. If such a release could be accomplished by the
common law, there would seem no reason why it could not likewise be effectuated by
statute.
40. Nelson v. Harper, 122 Ark. 39, 182 S. "V. 519 (1916) ; see Brown Shoe Co. v.
Stone, 172 Ark. 1156, 1163, 292 S. Vkr. 117, 120 (1927). Contra: King v. Hargadine-
McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 60 Ark. 1, 23 S. W. 514 (1894). For a discussion of the
problem of the effect of release clauses in general assignments, see Comment (1933) 47
YALE L. J. 944, 962; Note (1914) 50 L. P. A. (N.s.) 714.
41. 107 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
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receivers for reorganization of insolvent corporations was suspended. 42 But
such a result, of course, is not inevitable, even under the cases. It may be
argued from analogy of the Pobreslo and Star cases that such statutes, being
for the most part codifications of the common law equity receivership, 48 do
not go beyond the result available in the absence of statute, and therefore
cannot be classified as insolvency laws.44 In view of the fact that the reor-
ganization sections of the Federal Act are themselves adaptations of the
equity receivership, 45 however, the argument is quite unrealistic. Another
possible loophole lies in the specific provisions of an act such as Section 5(9)
of the Delaware Corporation Law, 46 which has served as the mddel for several
state statutes. It can be argued that the requirement of this type of statute
- that the reorganization provisions be included in "haec verba" in the charter
of the corporation -eliminates the suspension issue by placing the reor-
ganization upon a contractual rather than a statutory level. But, again, it is
apparent that the real authority for the reorganization proceeding derives
from the state. To hold that the state laws are, in essence, corporation laws
and consequently outside the scope of bankruptcy legislation, may be a further
method of salvaging them from suspension. 4r But, throughout the opinions
of the Supreme Court, runs the doctrine that Congress' power over the "sub-
ject of bankruptcies" covers nothing less than "the subject of the relations
between an insolvent or non-paying debtor, and his creditors, extending to
42. The case arose out of a petition by the bank to have its claim accorded priority
in the bankruptcy proceedings of a trucking corporation. A consent receiver had been
appointed by the state court in accordance with a New Mexico statute which provided
for reorganization plans, as well as for liquidation, of insolvent corporations. The re-
ceiver, acting under authority of the court, borrowed $8,000 from the bank, giving his
note for the amount, upon condition that such advances should be a paramount charge
upon the assets, subject only to the existing secured indebtedness. Some time thereafter-
it does not appear whether within 4 months-an involuntary petition was filed against
the debtor corporation in the United States District Court for the District of New Mex-
ico, and it was adjudicated a bankrupt. Presumably the assets were transferred by the
receiver to the trustee in bankruptcy. In denying the bank's claim for priority, except
for $1,710.26 used to prevent repossession of certain equipment, the court declared inter
alia that the statute invaded the area covered by the liquidation and reorganization pro-
visions of the National Bankruptcy Act and was consequently suspended.
43. Hazelwood v. Olinger Bldg. Dep't Stores, 205 Wis. 85, 236 N. W. 591 (1931);
see Miller, The Illinois Business Corporation Act and Bankruptcy Legislation (1935)
29 ILL. L. REV. 695, 711 et seq.
44. In reorganization through equity receivership, some courts asserted a power to
force creditors to accept an offer of securities under a plan, without providing the ortho-
dox, if misleading, alternative of a cash share in the proceeds of a sale at not less than
a fair upset price. Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922);
In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 16 F. Supp. 504 (1936). Contra: Coriell v. Morris
White, Inc., 54 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). By analogy to the Probeslo and Star
cases, then, a provision of a state reorganization statute for binding dissenters can be
upheld on the ground that it merely codifies a result obtainable at common law.
45. See FINLTTER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCy REORGANIZATION (1939) 19, 35.
46. Laws of Delaware 1929, c. 135, § 5(9).
47. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120 (1937); see
GLENN, LiQUiATION" (1935) 378 et seq.
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his or their relief.48 State laws for corporate reorganization come squarely
within such a definition.
From the decisions of the Supreme Court, it can be gathered that an
important element of a bankruptcy law is that it relate to the fiscal condition
of the debtor.49 But in view of the Court's definition of the "subject of bank-
ruptcies," almost any law dealing with insolvent or non-paying debtors and
their creditors could come within the power granted to the Federal Govern-
ment. Consequently, no satisfactory solution for the problem of the distri-
bution of state and federal powers over the administration of insolvent estates
is offered by the various efforts to define an insolvency law. Even if the
criteria were valid - which they are not - the props could be knocked from
under such distinctions by the all-inclusive definition of the Supreme Court.50
Likewise, permission for collateral attack, so anomalous in view of recent
cases,51 is scarcely a suitable working instrument for such distribution of
powers. Indeed, the opinions of the Supreme Court indicate a uniform and
understandable reluctance to overthrow insolvency proceedings under state
laws. In only one instance- the Pinkits case - was a collateral attack sus-
tained. If any balance is to be achieved between state and federal power over
the administration of debtors' estates, the Pinkits case must be overruled.
One possible line of attack on the Pinkus doctrine has been indicated by
the recent Chicot case.52 In denying collateral attack on a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding held under a statute later declared unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
ruled that the lower federal court's tacit assumption of jurisdiction was res
judicata as against a creditor who had received notice but had failed to appear.
Inasmuch as a court scarcely derives more power from an unconstitutional
statute than from state insolvency or reorganization laws held in abeyance,
it would seem that the Chicot rule could be applied to deny collateral attacks
on proceedings under these state statutes.ra The seemingly contrar , case of
48. See Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294
U. S. 648, 673 (1935) ; Hanover 'Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 186 111702).
49. In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U. S. 120 11937), the
Supreme Court held that a state law providing for revocation of the charter and dissolu-
tion of the corporation upon non-payment of franchise taxes did nit impinge upon the
field of bankruptcy since it in no way related to a state of insulvency. On the kasis of this
case, it may be argued that some of the reorganization statutes are v ithout the sc, pe of
the Bankruptcy Act because there are no specific provisions mating insolvency, either
in the equity or the bankruptcy sense, a condition precedent to the availability of the
statutes. The case of First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati Y. Flershem, 2q3 U. S. 504 (1934)
indicates, however, that an attempt by a solvent corporation to transfer it. asvts to a
receiver will be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. Consequently, it would seem that
the application of the statute will be sanctioned, if at all, only in the case of corporations
that are insolvent or unable to meet their debts.
50. See McLaughlin, Book Review (1936) 49 HAnr. L. REn'. 861, 865.
51. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank. (0 Sup. Ct. 317 (V. S.
1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); Davis v. Davis. 305 U. S. 32 (1933).
52. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank. (tl Sup. Ct. 317 (U. S.
1940), 49 YALE L. J. 959.
53. If the Chicot rule is applied, state insolvency and reorganization proceedings
would probably be binding as against all creditors with nAice who reside in the state.
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Kalb v. Feuerstein,54 sustaining a collateral attack on a state foreclosure
action expressly forbidden by the National Bankruptcy Act, can be distin-
guished away on the ground that it was based solely on the interpretation of
an automatic stay provision of Section 75.r5
A second possibility for overthrow of the Pinkus case lies in re-defining
"suspension" in the classic formula, not as permitting collateral attack upon
state proceedings, but as authorizing the supersession of state proceedings
by a petition in bankruptcy within the statutory period. Such an interpre-
tation at least provides a simple working rule. Sanction can be found for
this theory both in the opinion of the Boese case, 0 and in the statutory
language of the 1938 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. Section 2(a) (21)
requires receivers and assignees appointed in proceedings not under the Act
to turn over property to the bankruptcy trustee, provided ". . . that such
delivery and accounting shall not be required, except in proceedings under
Chapters X and XII of this Act, if the receiver or trustee was appointed, the
assignment made, or the agent was authorized more than four months prior
to the date of bankruptcy . . ."57 Jurisdiction under Chapter X is limited
by the provision in Section 146(4)5s that a "petition shall be deemed not to
be filed in good faith . . . if a prior proceeding is pending in any court
and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would be best
subserved in such prior proceedings." In the absence of any mention of
suspension in the Constitution, and of specific definition in the Bankruptcy
Act, these sections would dearly seem to contemplate that state proceedings
within the field occupied by the Act should continue to be available.5 0
Undoubtedly, the results that will follow from denying the possibility of
collateral attack on state insolvency proceedings are, for the most part, highly
controversial. It will be argued that the proposed theory of suspension is
destructive of uniformity in bankruptcy proceedings. But uniformity is
scarcely an end in itself; and many commentators have stressed the need
of local insolvency statutes to meet the varying problems of widely scattered
Such proceedings would seem to be in rem, at least for this limited purpose. See St.
Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Spiller, 274 U. S. 304 (1927). However, complications might
arise if a non-assenting, out-of-state creditor were to attack the proceedings ol the
grounds that he was not a party to the action or that such proceedings had no effect at all
on his rights. Moreover, it could be argued that an overriding public policy demands
that state insolvency proceedings be disallowed, even as against the policy of terminat-
ing litigation. See Vallely v. Northern Fire Insurance Co., 254 U. S. 348 (1920).
54. 60 Sup. Ct. 343 (U. S. 1940). The state proceeding involved in this case was
not an insolvency proceeding under a state insolvency law, but simply a mortgage fore-
closure action.
55. 47 STAT. 1470 (1933), as amended, 52 STAT. 84, 11 U. S. C. § 203 (Supp. 1938).
56. Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379 (1883).
57. 52 STAT. 842, 11 U. S. C. §.11 (Supp. 1938).
58. 52 STAT. 887, 11 U. S. C. § 546 (Supp. 1938).
59. The suggested approach was recently adopted in the case of Gallagher v. Keystone
Realty Holding Co., 333 Pa. Rep. 9, 3 A. (2d) 426 (1939), affirming the appointment of
a receiver for an insolvent corporation under a Pennsylvania statute.
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individuals and corporations.60 Indeed, as a matter of policy, there is much
to be said for allowing the states to act as forty-eight experimental stations
for bankruptcy legislation. Certainly the constant pressure to amend the
Federal Act suggests that it has not yet proved an ideal solution for the social
problem of insolvency. But, if such were the rule, state reorganization statutes
could be resorted to by corporations in order to avoid the stricter provisions
of Chapter X. Inasmuch as these proceedings will almost always involve an
act of bankruptcy,0 1 the threat of an involuntary petition may help to balance
the scales. The suggested rule, of course, would eliminate the "blind spot"
controversy and subject farmers and wage-earners to involuntary proceedings
in the state courts. In the case of the individual small debtor, however, the
outlook seems generally favorable. State arrangements would afford the
insolvent a discharge without the stigma of bankruptcy, while providing,
through cheaper administration costs, higher dividends for the creditors.
Denial of collateral attacks would further insure a ratable distribution by
preventing garnishment by the diligent dissenter. But perhaps the greatest
single advantage - at least the greatest novelty - of the proposed definition
of suspension is its certainty of operation in a field where chaos has reigned
supreme.
STRICT PRIORITY IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION*
Two views of the proper distribution of losses in corporate reorganization
have competed for recognition for at least forty years. Under one view -
the "strict priority" rule - the capitalization of the reorganized company
is limited by the value of the assets, and junior claimants may receive an
interest in the company only to the extent that the value of the assets exceeds
the claims of senior classes. Under the second view, less limitation is placed
upon the power of the parties to negotiate a distribution. Strict priority,
based on an adherence to contract rights, thus directs the brunt of reorgan-
ization upon the stockholder and, sometimes, other junior claimants, while
the rule of "negotiation" apportions the burden among all classes.'
60. See Douglas, WVage Earner Bankrupties-State v. Federal Control (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 591, 638, Garrison, Wisconsin's Arew "Personal Reciv'ership" Law 1933 J, xs.
L. Rzv. 201, 225.
61. "Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having . . . (5) While in-
solvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered volun-
tarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property." § 3a(5)
of Bankruptcy Act, 52 ST.T. 844, 11 U. S. C. § 21 (Supp. 1938).
* Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939).
1. The literature on these two theories has been abundant. See, e.g., Bonbright and
Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate
Reorganisation; (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 127: Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Rcorgani.a-
tion (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923; Rostow and Cutler, Conpeting Systems of Corporate Re-
organization: Chapters X and XI of the Banklrupt, .4ct (1939) 48'YALE L. J. 1334;
Moore, Railroad Fixed Charges in Bankruptcy Proceedings (1939) 47 J. PoL. Eco.. 100.
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Apart from the direct effect upon pursestrings, the choice between the rival
doctrines may have a broader influence upon soundness of capital structures.
Application of strict priority, which requires the elimination of shareholders
and junior creditors with worthless interests, focuses attention upon the
valuation of the assets and tends to pare down the fixed capitalization of
the reorganized company. Negotiators, on the other hand, are apt to lose
sight of the valuation problem; a tendency to excessive capitalization and
overheavy debt structures may be the consequence. More speculative is the
effect of the application of the rule of strict priority as a deterrent to the
creation of unsound capital structures. Although it is arguable that man-
agement will hesitate to rear dangerously pyramided financial structures if
it knows that its thin equity investment and control will be treated harshly,
organizers typically do not envision reorganization at the time of promotion
or expansion. 2 A more direct and effective curb upon unsound financial struc-
tures might be achieved by charter restrictions 8 or by administrative control
comparable to that provided in Section 7 of the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1934.
4
Whatever the respective merits of the rules, it was early indicated by the
Supreme Court in the famous Boyd case6 that strict priority was to control
in equity reorganizations. Despite this pronouncement, the lower federal
courts have persisted in sanctioning stockholder participation in reorgan-
ization plans even though creditors received less than the full value of their
claims. 6 This policy probably had its genesis in the feeling that generous
2. On the economic and business arguments behind the choice of theories, cf. Rostow
and Cutler, supra note 1, at 1374-1376; Moore, supra note 1, at 120-124.
3. In this connection consideration should be given to the provisions of 1216(12)
of Chapter X of the Chandler Act. 52 STAr. 897, 11 U. S. C. § 616 (Supp. 1938). This
section provides, inter alia, for the inclusion in the reorganization plan of charter restric-
tions upon the issuance of securities.
4. 49 STAT. 815 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79g (Supp. 1938). See Consumers Power
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1854, Dec. 28, 1939, (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 746,
Cf. Dayton Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1925, Feb. 7, 1940;
Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1931, Feb. 13, 1940
(Commissioner Frank concurring at 16).
5. Northern P. R. R. v. Boyd. 228 U. S. 482 (1913). The Boyd case was fore-
shadowed by Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392 (U. S. 1868), and
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. '& C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899), and was
reiterated by Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1926).
Cf. it re 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., 299 U. S. 24 (1936) ; Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elec. Corp., 306 U. S. 307 (1939) ; First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934).
But cf. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 451, 452 (1937).
6. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Los Angeles Lumber case "because
of the contrariety of tendencies in practical administration of the Act among the cir-
cuits." 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 4 (U. S. 1939). Despite a finding or assumption of insolvency,
some courts have permitted stockholders to participate without requiring a new contri-
bution. In re A. C. Hotel Co., 93 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Farlee & Co. v.
Springfield-South Main Realty Co., 86 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) ; Downtown
Investment Ass'n -v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs. Inc., 81 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 1st,
1936) ; In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1935) ; In re United Railways & Elec.
Co., 11 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1935). Some circuit courts, however, have adhered to the
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treatment of junior claimants would minimize nuisance litigation by stock-
holders who sought a share of the spoils; 7 a desire enhanced, perhaps, by
uncertainty as to the meaning of the Boyd case. So strong has this feeling
been, that some lower courts have ruled that the principle of the Boyd case
did not apply to 77B proceedings.8 Other courts, interpreting the statutory
standard of "fair and equitable" to which a 77B reorganization must con-
form, professed to find the plan's fairness in its approval by the large majority
of the various classes ;9 a process of reasoning which ignored the perfunctory
quality of claimants' votes of approval, extracted by zealous "protective"
committeemen.
The typical trial court attitude toward reorganization plans was exempli-
fied in the lower court 77B proceedings in the recent Los Angeles Lumber
case.10 In 1938 the federal district court found petitioner corporation to be
hopelessly insolvent in both equity and bankruptcy senses; the going concern
value of its assets was set at $830,000, while the claims of the first mortgage
bondholders to principal and interest aggregated $3,800,000. Petitioner had
nevertheless filed a plan, approved by 92.81% of the bondholders- and
99.75% and 90% respectively of the Class A and B stockholders - whereby
the bondholders would receive securities representing only 77o of the assets
and voting power of a newly-formed corporation and the balance would be
issued to old Class A stockholders. The plan provided for the authorization
by the new corporation of 1,000,000 shares of $1 par value voting stock,
divided into 811,375 shares of 5% non-cumulative preferred stock and 18,625
shares of common stock. 170,000 of the preferred shares were to be reserved
for future financing, the remaining 641,375 were to be issued to the bond-
holders. The Class A stockholders received all the 188,625 shares of common
stock, without payment of any subscription or assessment. Xo provision was
made for the old Class B stockholders, most of whom were also bondholders.
To justify its approval of stockholder participation, the district court pointed
to several "considerations" received by the bondholders from the Class A
stockholders. These considerations were the "familiarity with the operation
of the business" and the "financial standing and influence in the community"
of the old stockholder-management; the amount by whichothe going concern
value of the business exceeded the amount realizable at a forced sale; the
stockholders' waiver of their right, by virtue of a previous agreement, to
retain control of the company until 1944; and the avoidance of litigation with
rule of strict priority. In re Barclay Park Corp., 90 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
In re Philadelphia & Reading- Coal & Iron Co., Appeal of Schrager, 105 F. (2d) 357
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. Sth,
1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 626 (1938).
7. Foster, supra note 1, at 928 et seq.; ef. Moore, supra note 1, at 116.
8. Downtown Investment Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldg., Inc., 81 F. (24) 314
(C. C. A. 1st, 1936) ; In re Stanley Drug Co., 22 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
9. See In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 501, 503 ( S. D.
Cal. 1933) ; Downtown Investment Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc., 81 F.
(2d) 314, 323-324 (C. C. A. 1st. 1936).
10. In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 501 (S. D. Cal. 1933),
aff'd, 100 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
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the old stockholders. When coupled with the preservation of relative priority
between bondholders and stockholders, and the high percentage of bondholder
approval, these were deemed sufficient by the district and circuit courts to
warrant affirmance of the plan.
A unanimous Supreme Court, however, disapproved the plan and the
reasoning of the lower courts." At the outset, the Court stated that "the
fact that the vast majority of the security holders have approved the plan
is not the test of whether the plan is a fair and equitable one ;" on that
question the trial court must exercise its "informed, independent judgment."
And, said the Court, a plan must comply with the "fixed principle" of the
Boyd case in order to be "fair and equitable," since that phrase was one of
art which had acquired a fixed content in equity reorganization. The Court
expressly repudiated the use of any of the aforementioned intangible con-
siderations as a basis for stockholder participation. Stockholders may par-
ticipate in a reorganization of an enterprise insolvent in the bankruptcy sense,
it said, only to the extent that they have "contributed in money or in money's
worth,12 reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the par-
ticipation of the stockholder."' 8
Despite the Court's unreserved approval of the rule of strict priority, both
the simple fact situation in the case and the language of the opinion leave
major ambiguities as to the content of that rule. The doctrine, drawing its
strength from the sanctity of contract rights, requires that claimants be
completely compensated in order of seniority while the available assets last.
14
Yet the nature and amount of the claim which must be fully compensated
remain partly shrouded in doubt. Although the prior creditor's senior right
to principal and accrued interest is settled,' 5 his preferred claim to income
is not.16 The Supreme Court's utterance in the Boyd case, reiterated in the
Los Angeles Lumber case, that a creditor's interest "can be preserved by
11. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. I (U. S. 1939).
12. The Court's repudiation of the desirability of continuing the present management
in office as a consideration warranting stockholder participation in reorganization does not
necessarily foreclose the possibility of such participation where the retention of the man-
agement may be essential to the future successful operation of the business. Under those
circumstances management-stockholders may be considered to have contributed "money's
worth." Cf. It; re Barclay- Park Corp., 90 F. (2d) 595, 598 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; First
Nat. Bank v. Poland Union, 109 F. (2d) 54, 56 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
13. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 10 (U. S. 1939).
14. ". . . in passing upon the merits of reorganization plans, the Commission has in-
sisted and will continue to insist upon adherence to another basic democratic principle-
namely, the sanctity of contracts . . . The Boyd case was a message to the profession
that the assets must be divided, as far as they would go, among security holders in accord-
ance with their contract rights and priorities-in short, that the doctrine of the sanctity
of contract is not abrogated by the equity reorganizaion procedure . . ." Address of
Abe Fortas, Former Assistant Director of Public Utilities Division, SEC (July 14,
1938) 6.
15. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939);
Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U: S. 445 (1926) ; In re New
York Rys. Corp., 82 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 687 (1936).
16. Cf. Rostow and Cutler, supra note 1, at 1347, n. 63. Cf. In re Murel Holding
Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941, 942 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
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the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock"? does
not foreclose the possibility that full priority requires the creditor to be
remunerated for any sacrifice of rights to income. That compensation may
be due was indicated in a recent SEC advisory report on the La Fra;nce
reorganization.' 8 There, one of the grounds for disapproval of the plan was
the failure to provide compensation to bondholders for a proposed reduction
of claims to future income.
Unclarified, also, is the technique to be employed in distributing securities,
once the extent of the participation of the various claimants has been deter-
mined. Enforcement of contract rights might require that prior claimants
retain their preferred status after reorganization. To accomplish this result,
each group of participants would be awarded a separate stratum of securities
in the reorganized company. Sensible planners, however, are aware of the
need to simplify capital structures and reduce fixed obligations to stave off
recurrent visits to reorganization' -a need reinforced by the statutory
requirement that a plan be "feasible" as well as "fair and equitable." -0 Sig-
nificant as a means to reconcile the apparent conflict between simplicity and
priority is the holding by the Supreme Court in the esoteric Kansas City
Terminal case.21 The Court there said that deference to full priority rights
of a creditor does not require that "in every reorganization the securities
.offered to the general creditors must be superior in rank or grade to any
which stockholders may obtain." 2 2 Both the zealous utilization of that holding
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in cases under its jurisdiction,23
and the approbation accorded the case in the Los Angeles Lumber opinion
point toward the validity of the issue of the same grade of security to different
classes of claimants as a proper method of distribution despite the rule of
priority. But the Commission's widespread application is not warranted by
the circumstances of the Kansas City Tcrniinal case. There, although un-
secured creditors, and preferred and common stockholders were given the
same types of securities given to secured creditors, they made substantial cash
contributions. Since the Court expressly stated that "there is nothing to show
. . . the probable value of the equity in the property beyond secured debts,"2
17. Northern P. R. R. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 508 (1913); Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 8 (U. S. 1939).
18. La France Industries, SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16. August 30, 1939.
19. Cf. Rostow and Cutler, supra note 1, at 1374 et seq.
20. 52'STAT. 897; 11 U. S. C. 621 (Supp. 1938). Cf. La France Industries, SEC
Corp. Reorg. Releases No. 16, Aug. 30, 1939, p. 18, and No. 17, Xov. 3. 1939.
21. Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1926).
22. Id. at 455.
23. The Commission has said that "it is often not neces'ary to allocate, to holders
of senior securities, new securities prior in rank to those allocated to holders of junior
securities, provided that any alteration of priority is adequately compensated for in terms
of the relative amount of new junior securities received by them, or otherwise." Utilities
Power & Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 26, 1939, p. 20. See
also, West Ohio Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, Oct. 14, 1933, p. 9;
Community Power and Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1893, Nov. 13,
1939, p. 11, n. 4. Cf. La France Industries, SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16, Aug. 3),
1939. But cf. concurring opinions of Commissioner Healey, cited infra note 25.
24. Kansas City Term. Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 453 (1926).
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a quid pro quo contribution must be assumed; under those circumstances
the decision can only be taken to mean that where classes have contributed
full value there is no restriction upon the character of the securities they
may receive. 25 This narrow construction seems to complement the Los
Angeles Lumber holding that stockholders may participate only in the amount
of their contributions. The need for simplification of capital structure, never-
theless, justifies broader judicial interpretation of the Kansas City Terminal
case. The Commission's policy evidently is to approve as fair plans in which
creditors' priorities, both as to income and as to principal, are to some extent
sacrificed in the interest of what is thought to be financial feasibility. The
Commission regards its standards as requiring that a creditor be given a new
claim equal in face amount to the claim he has given up, even though its
position in the new capital structure results in a loss of prior rights as to
principal, important as determining bargaining position in the event of a new
reorganization, and as to income. It is to be doubted that this view, concerned
more with the balance sheet entries than with priority of income, will entirely
satisfy the policy of priority proclaimed in the Los Angeles Lumber case.
There is some reason to believe that, under the revised procedure of
Chapter X, courts will accord more deference to the Los Angeles Lumber
case than they accorded to the Boyd case in equity reorganizations and 77B
proceedings. The machinery under Chapter X requiring submission of a
plan of reorganization to the court 26 by an independent trustee 27 and pro-
viding for court approval prior to claimants' vote 28 makes it less likely that
the plan will be formulated by the management or equity interests 29 and
rubber-stamped by participants. And in any case, in larger proceedings, the
court will have the benefit of an advisory report by the SEC, 0 which has
ardently espoused the strict priority rule.3'
It should be remembered, however, that previous lower court rejection
of the doctrine of strict priority was motivated by a desire to avoid nuisance
litigation. Neither Supreme Court repetition of the rule nor revised pro-
cedure will eliminate such litigation. Until it has been established that a
stockholder's claims are without value, he is entitled to his day in court;
long and expensive litigation surrounding valuation may be the result. Courts,
writhing under conflicting and plentiful testimony on valuation, may be
impelled, therefore, to circumvent the spirit of the Los Angeles Lumber case
25. This is the interpretation placed upon the case by Judge Healy of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. See Holding Company Act Release No. 1668, published
Aug. 8, 1939, concurring in West Ohio Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No.
1284, Oct. 14, 1938; Holding Act Release No. 1655-A, concurring in Utilities Power &
Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 26, 1939.
26. § 169, 52 STAT. 890, 11 U. S. C. § 569 (Supp. 1938).
27. § 156, 52 STAT. 888, 11 U. S. C. § 556 (Supp. 1938).
28. § 176, 52 STAT. 891, 11 U. S. C. § 576 (Supp. 1938).
29. Management may still be influential in draftsmanship since it may submit a pro-
posed plan to the trustee. § 167(6), 52 STAT. 890, 11 U. S. C. § 567 (Supp. 1938).
30. If the indebtedness of the debtor exceeds $3,000,000, such a report is mandatory,
if less, optional. § 172, 52 STAT. 890, 11 U. S. C. § 572 (Supp. 1938).
31. Utilities Power & Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July
26, 1939; LaFrance Industries, SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16, Aug. 30, 1939.
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by making generous estimates of the valuation of assets, which in any event,
it is said, should be based upon prediction of prospective earnings3 2 capital-
ized at uncertain rates.33 Valuation is so inexact a process and so much a
matter of discretion, as to make this an easy method of dispensing bounty to
stockholders.
If, however, the lower courts do adhere to the rule of the Los Angeles
Lumber case, management interests may be stimulated to seek other methods
of reorganization. One such avenue of escape might be a petition under
Chapter XI of the Chandler Act3 4 to which, conceivably, the Los Angcles
Lumber decision might not be applicable. Although the artful expression
"fair and equitable" is also present in this chapter,35 statutory protisions co
and dicta in the Los Angeles Lumber case 37 indicate that the principles of
negotiation are more likely to attain.38 Another alternative would be the
use of a "voluntary" reorganization- an attempt at recapitalization before
the company's name has been sullied by insolvency, equity or bankruptcy.
Although the principles of strict priority are equally applicable to a volun-
tary reorganization,3 9 the court has no statutory duty to scrutinize inde-
pendently the fairness of the plan and exclude worthless interests. Even
though alert dissenters might still establish their claims, apathetic assenters
would be bound.
32. See Rostow and Cutler, supra note 1, at 1350, n. 73. The SEC has adopted this
method of valuation. Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S. E. C. 104, 112 (1938) ; Utilities
Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 26, 1939, p. 17; La
France Industries, SEC. Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16, Aug. 30, 1939, p. 11.
33. The first timid attempts at the use of rates of capitalization have been made by
the SEC. In the La France report, supra note 32, at 16, the SEC said "because of the
apparent risks involved in the operations of the. . . companies evidenced in part by their
history of fluctuating income, 10% would seem to be a fair rate of capitalization:' Earn-
ings of a foreign subsidiary, "because of the relative stability of operations and . . .
earnings record" were capitalized at 97. Report, p. 12. See also Mountain State- Power
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1570, June 2, 1939, p. 6 (6 or 7%', utility com-
pany): Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 13, June 7, 1939,
p. 8 (10% "in view of the riskful nature of the enterprise").
34. 52 STAT. 905-16, 11 U. S. C. §§ 702-799 (Supp. 1938).
35. § 366, 52 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. § 766 (Supp. 1938).
36. § 356, 52 STAT. 910, 11 U. S. C. § 756 (Supp. 193S), provides that "an arrange-
ment within the meaning of this Chapter shall include provisions modifying or altering
the rights of unsecured creditors . . ." It has been assumed that this provision denies
courts under Chapter XI any authority to deal with stockholders. But the power to
modify unsecured claims, in the light of the necessity to achieve a "fair and equitable"
arrangement, may be regarded as including a power to modify interests treated in equity
as inferior to unsecured debts.
37. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 9, n. 14 (U. S.
1939). But cf. In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., 108 F. (2d) 794, Sol
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (Clark, J., dissenting).
38. That Chapter XI is available to corporations with publicly held securities for
the readjustment of unsecured debt has been indicated in two recent decisions, In re United
States Realty and Improvement Co., 103 F. (2d) 794 (C.C. A. 2d, 1940), and In re
Credit Service, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 878 (D. Md. 1940). See (1940) 49 YAr= L. J. 927.
39. First Nat Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934).
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REMOVAL OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIEN AS AFFECTED
BY POWER OF SALE IN MORTGAGE*
LEGISLATIVE modification of the federal law of income tax liens' has con-
tinually reflected Congressional willingness to curtail full exercise of the
sovereign power to collect revenue, and to temper the harsh effects of earlier
tax-collection measures.2 However, judicial vacillation in construing the
provisions of the lien statute has frequently occasioned undeserved loss to
transferees of the tax debtor's property.3
As modified by amendment and interpretation since its inception in 1866,
4
the federal income tax lien now provides that, subject to certain provisions
for notice, enacted for the benefit of bona fide purchasers, mortgagees and
lienors, 5 taxes unpaid after demand automatically become a "lien in favor
of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to" the tax debtor." Notice of lien filed in the district
court perfects the general lien arising by operation of the statute, rendering
it specific as to all property of the tax debtor located within the district.
7
Whatever priority such lien enjoyed among the hierarchy of claims against
the property at the time notice was filed is retained as against purchasers
and subsequent mortgagees or lienors.8 In ascertaining what is to be con-
sidered "property" of the tax debtor for purposes of the Act, state law is
held to govern.9 Where parties are enmeshed in complex legal relationship
*,Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
1. REv. STAT. § 3186 (1875) ; 26 U. S. C. § 1560 (1934). For a valuable discussion
of this and related legislation, see 5 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAX-
ATION (1934) 386-413. See also Kohlmeier, Federal Tax Liens Under Revised Stattes-
Section 3186 (1935) 13 TAX MAG. 191.
2. See Rogge, The Tax Lien of the United States (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 576, 578
et seq. Kohlmeier, supra note 1, at 194. Judicial leanings in the same direction have
found frequent expression. United States v. Pacific R. R., 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,983 (E. D.
Mo. 1877), 1 Fed. 97 (E. D. Mo. 1880). Where courts felt compelled to enforce the
earlier lien strictly, harshness of results provoked suggestions of amendment. United
States v. Curry, 201 Fed. 371 (D. Md. 1912).
3. In several instances, courts have likewise rendered questionable decisions preju-
dicing Government interests, to the benefit of tax debtors, transferees of tax debtors'
property, and state or local governments. United States v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 19 F. (2d) 157 (S. D. N. Y. 1926), aff'd, 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), 41
YALE L. J. 130; People of New York v. Maclay, 37 F. (2d) 22 (C C. A. 2d, 1930), 30
COL. L. REv. 774; Berrymont Land Co. v. Davis Creek Land & Coal Co., 119 W. Va.
186, 192 S. E. 577 (1937), 44 W. VA. L. Q. 232.
4. 14 STAT. 107 (1866), as amended, 20 STAT. 331 (1879), as amended, 37 STAT.
1016 (1913), as amended, 43 STAT. 994 (1925), as amended, 45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U.
S. C. §§ 1560-1567 (1934), as amended, 48 STAT. 757 (1934), 26 U. S. C. § 1564 (Supp.
1938).
5. 37 STAT. 1016 (1913), 26 U. S. C. §§ 1560-1567 (1934).
6. Ray. STAT. §3186 (1875), 26 U. S. C. §1560 (1934).
7. 45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S. C. §§ 1560-1567 (1934).
8. See Kohlmeier, supra note 1, at 193 et seq.
9. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930) ; Lang v. Comm'r, 61 F. (2d) 280 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1932) ; Shaw v. United States, 394 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. g 9463 (W. D.
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with each other, the question of ownership, as a recent decision'0 serves to
illustrate, is often difficult to determine.
During the years 1929 and 1930, an insurance company acquired through
assignment three mortgages upon Michigan properties, notice of the mort-
gages and the assignment thereof having been duly recorded. Each mortgage
contained an acceleration clause" and a provision whereby the mortgagee
was empowered to sell the premises upon default and apply the proceeds
upon the debts. Thereafter, prior to foreclosure, the United States acquired
a valid and subsisting lien for income taxes on the mortgagor's properties
pursuant to statutory provisions. On default, the mortgagee availed itself
of both the acceleration and power of sale clauses in the mortgage agree-
ment, becoming purchaser of the premises through public sale' at a price
insufficient to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness. The Government was not
a party to these proceedings and neither consented to nor ratified the sale.
Subsequently, after the statutory period of redemption had expired, the
mortgagee sought to remove the cloud on title by filing a bill for final deter-
mination of all claims to or liens upon the real estate in question, praying
that the federal district court decree the lien of the United States to have
been foreclosed by the power of sale proceedings and, in the alternative, that
the properties be resold in accordance with statutory provisions. From a
decree holding the lien still subsisting and ordering resale, the mortgagee
appealed; but the decree was upheld in a two-to-one decision by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Omitting close examination of the property interests involved, the majority
disposed of the case on jurisdictional grounds. On the justifiable premise
that immunity of the sovereign to suit without its consent compelled close
Mich. 1939). However, courts draw a distinction between state "rules ol property" and
"exemptions." The income tax lien, by definition, is qualified in scope, in conformance
with rules of property. Cannon v. Nicholas. 80 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935);
United States v. Steele, 394 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Ser. 1 9707 (N. D. N. Y. 1939);
Shaw v. United States, supra; Ullman v. Rothensies, 394 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv.
119333 (E. D. Pa. 1939). But exemptions have no limiting effect whatsoever upon fed-
eral liens. Jamison v. Geers, 353 (A) C. C. H. 1935 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 9319 (IV. D. Ohla.
1935) ; It re Rosenberg's Estate, 269 N. Y. 247. 199 N. E. 205 (1935), cert. denlicd, 293
U. S. 669 (1936) ; Staley v. Vaughn, 50 S. W. (2d) 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). More-
over, a state law regulating recordation of federal liens, enacted pursuant to permissive
practice under Revised Statutes, § 3186, has been held ineffective in respect to such liens
by reason of being unduly burdensome upon the Federal Government, hence outside the
scope of its statutory consent. In re Dartmont Coal Co., 46 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 4th,
1931). See also United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210 (1893).
10. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939).
11. This provided that the mortgagee, upon any default, had the option to declare the
entire principal balances presently due and payable. Record on Appeal, p. 7.
12. Unlike that of some other states, the law of 'Michigan permits the mortgagee to
purchase the premises at a sale conducted pursuant to exercise of a power of sale in a
mortgage. 21 Mici. ST.T. A-m. (Henderson, 1936) § 27.1228. See 3 Jo:,Es, Iofr-
GAGES (1928) 943 et seq.
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adherence to the statutory provisions for removal of income tax liens, 13 the
majority concluded that federal jurisdiction in granting such relief was con-
fined to a decree of resale. The court's interpretation of the statute was based
on emphasis upon the power of the Government to prescribe rules for tax-
collection, in contradistinction to Congressional delineations of the exercise
of such power.
Pursuant to Section 3207 of the Revised Statutes, any person having a
lien upon real estate which was recorded prior to the filing of notice of the
federal tax lien or any person purchasing real estate at a sale to satisfy
such antecedent lien may, after carrying out certain prescribed formalities,
file a bill in chancery in the district court to extinguish the tax lien.14 By
terms of the Act it is mandatory that the United States, and all persons
having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property, be joined as party
defendants. Contradiction of the court's position on jurisdiction manifests
itself in express wording of the statute that the district court "shall .
proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein . . and, in all cases
where a claim or interest of the United States therein is established, shall
decree a sale of such real estate . . . and a distribution of the proceeds of
such sale . . ."15
Apparently, jurisdiction extended to a determination whether or not there
was a valid and subsisting federal lien. It is equally clear that, if existence
of the lien had been correctly resolved in favor of the Government, the court
could not have removed it by decree but would have been forced to order
a resale of the property. In arriving at its result, the majority failed to
distinguish between releasing a specific lien and adjudicating a specific lien
to be non-existent.16 Under this view, an income tax lien, once it has properly
13. This proposition is well settled. United States v. Michel, 282 U. S. 656 (1931).
However, a strong case can be made out for not unduly limiting taxpayers' remedies on
grounds of sovereignty. See Silbert, Federal Tax Remedies and the Doctrine of Sover-
eignty (1938) 26 GEO. L. J. 221, 224 et seq.
14. Such person, upon requesting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in writing to
direct filing of a bill in chancery as provided in § 1127(a), 44 SWAT. 123 (1926), 26 U. S.
C. § 1569 (1934), and showing failure of the Commissioner to comply within six months
after receipt of such written request, may, having first notified the Commissioner, file a
petition in the federal district court for the district within which the real estate is located,
praying leave to file a bill for a final determination of all claims to or liens upon the real
estate in question. § 1127(b), 44 STAT. 124 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1569 (1934). Granting
of the petition lies in the discretion of the court. § 1127, id.
15. § 1127(b), 44 STAT. 124 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1569 (1934). The instant suit was
instituted on March 17, 1936. On June 22, 1936, Congress amended the statute to read:
". .. may decree a sale . . ." 49 STAT. 1743 (1936), 26 U. S. C. § 1569 (Supp. 1938).
The present wording, which renders the decree of sale permissive rather than mandatory,
tends to weaken the position here contended for by the Government and upheld by the
court.
16. Release or discharge of a federal lien, i.e., termination of its present legal opera-
tion, is predicated upon affirmative compliance with statutory requirements, such as pay-
ment of the tax debt, or subjection of the encumbered property to judicial sale for satis-
faction of the lien, or furnishing of a bond to secure payment. But judicial declaration
that the lien is non-existent is very different, amounting to an assertion, not that neces-
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attached, assumes some absolute status, destructible only upon bubmission of
the premises to resale, in accordance with the provisions of the statute.
Destructibility of the tax debtor's property interest, by reason of limitation
on its extent, and consequent failure of the lien for want of a res are ignorel
as possibilities. Such oversight is difficult to reconcile not only with express
statutory restrictions on scope of the income tax lien,'- but also with the
unresolved premise of the majority that the lien attached only to "property
in possession of the taxpayer to the extent of his interest in and rights thereto,
depending upon contracts and unexecuted instruments . . ."Is
As pointed out by the dissent, the position of the court impotes upon any
prior lienor who attempts to clear title under the statutory provisions an
automatic concession of the present validity of income tax liens in favor ui
the United States. Logic compels this result because, although power of the
court to order a resale is expressly confined to cases wherein a claim Gr
interest of the Government has been established,10 the holding limits the power
to remove liens to such order of resale. In so precluding resort to the Act
for removal of a cloud upon title in the form of a record lien, the decision
reaches a result which Congress unquestionably did not intend and which
judicial reasoning has hitherto rejected.20
Even where the federal lien has been found to be valid and subsisting!.
removal by decree has been granted upon a showing that the value of the
property in question at the time of the petition was insufficient to yield pro-
ceeds over and above senior liens.2 Although on the facts of the principal
case no indication of the value of the real estate appears, the applicable rule,
as it has been initially sketched out in several lower courts, does not seem
sar- affirmative steps for release of the lien have hicen priperly carried nlt. but that tlere
is no necessity for carrying them out.
17. In attaching to the "'property" of the tax dehtkor. the lien is mncec-arily limited
by definition. See Sheridan v. Allen, 153 Fed. 5t68 ( C. C. A. Sth. P10f)7 1.
18. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States. 107 F. 12d 111, 313 1C. C. A. ,
1939).
19. Section 1127(b), 44 ST.,AT. 123 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1569(e) (1934).
20. Trust Co. of Texas v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 61M (S. 1. Te". 19331 ; ace rd,
cchietti v. Meli, 384 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 0275 (E. D. Pa. 193S I ; Oden v.
United States, 33 F. (2d) 553 (W. D. La. 1929).
21. Belluce v. Meli. 384 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. r 724 (E. D. Pa. 193S ;
Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States. 47 F. (2d) 042 N . Tex. 1931); Odcn
v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 553 (W. D. La. 1929). Contra: Integrity Trust Co. v.
United States, 3 F. Supp. 577 (D. N. J. 1933); cf. Czieslik v. Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 715
(E. D. N. Y. 1932). Clearly distinguishing all the above cited cases from the instant
case is the fact that they were concerned wvith the value of the property interest to v.hich
the lien of the United States admittedly attached. The inwtant ca-e primarily involved
consideration whether oir not any property interest of the tax debtor still existed to which
the lien of the United States might attach. If removal of a lien hy decree i, granted v:'here
the supporting property interest is found to have no value, a fortiori. removal by decree
should be granted where the supporting property interest is foiund no longer to edist. See
note 36 hnfra. See also Shav v. United States, 394 C. C. H. 193) Fed. Ta% Serv. f" 94V3
(NV. D. Mich. 1939).
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to be predicated upon any considerations as to value.22 In Trust Company
of Texas v. United States,23 the district court acquiesced in removing a federal
lien by decree under circumstances virtually identical to those of the instant
case. 24 Adherence to such a rule, where vested property interests are at stake
and the contemplated departure, based on questionable statutory construc-
tion, gives no promise of any material aid to tax-collection, would seem ad-
visable even in absence of the cogent arguments in its justification.
Assuming that the district court had jurisdiction to remove the lien by
decree, the question still remains whether the facts of the principal case
compelled such action. In Michigan, a mortgage does not effect a convey-
ance of legal title to the mortgagee, but is considered to create only a lien
as security for the debt.2 5 Accordingly, legal title remains in the mortgagor
up to the time of foreclosure and sale, and becomes absolute in the purchaser
only after the statutory period of redemption has expired .2  The same is true
of mortgages embodying a power of sale, though it imparts to the mortgagee
the cumulative remedy of non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. 27  Hence,
it is plain that at the time the Government lien attached in the instant case,
the tax debtor had an interest in the property.
However, the effect of a power of sale upon the legal relationships of the
parties is more far-reaching than at first appears. It confers upon the mort-
gagee a contingent, but irrevocable, power of attorney to convey title to the
premises in question.28 Such power, though arising in conjunction with an
enforceable contract of debt, differs from the contract right to payment of
the debt in that it is not extinguished by the running of the statute of limita-
tions.2 9 Since power of disposal has long been recognized as a primary attri-
bute of "property," the power of sale, even though conditional, has been
described as a property right.30 Whatever definitive terminology is employed,
the conclusion is inescapable that the mortgagor's interest in the property
is decreased by grant of the power of sale, and that of the mortgagee in-
creased. Conveyance of the premises is subject to possible future exercise
22. See cases cited supra note 20.
23. 3 F. Supp. 683 (S. D. Tex. 1933).
24. No perceptible distinction of any significance can be found between the two cases.
Legal operation of the power of sale under the trust deed form of collateral present in
the Trust Co. of Texas case, supra note 20, is the same as that of the power of sale in
the mortgage form of security in the instant case, at least in so far as such might affect
the question under discussion.
25. Dawson v. Peter, 119 Mich. 274, 77 N. V. 997 (1899).
26. White v. Fulton, 260 Mich. 346, 244 N. W. 498 (1932).
27. Bell Silver & Copper Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Butte, 156 U. S. '170,
477 (1895). See 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (1928) 802.
28. See 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (1928) 811, 822. The power of sale is usually but not
always deemed to be "coupled with an interest," hence irrevocable.
29. The power of sale is contractual in origin. When its exercise is enforced by the
courts, the sale is by virtue of the power and not of the judicial, decree. 3 JoEs, MORT-
GAGES (1928) 809. Running of the statute of limitations on the debt secured by the power
does not operate to revoke the power. Nor does supervening bankruptcy of the mortgagor
in any way affect the mortgagee's authority to exercise the power. Id. at 835.
30. Jackson v. Lawrence, 117 U. S. 679, 682 (1886).
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of the power.31 Likewise, it is the prevailing rule that subsequent private
lienors acquire their interests subject to non-judicial foreclosure in which
they have no right to participate or to be joined as parties. 2 Moreover, courts
have been unwilling to concede any better position in this respect to the
federal tax lien than to private liens.m 3 While it is well settled that a federal
lien may not be foreclosed in a judicial proceeding to which the United States
is not a party3 4 and that the sovereign may not be made a party defendant
in any action without its consent,3 5 it by no means follows that the Govern-
ment may not be bound in a foreclosure operating by force of a contract
entered into with full consent of the party through which the Government
derives its interest.30
The chief effect of the court's decision is materially to impair the value and
usefulness of the power of sale as security.3 7 Purchase of the premises by
the mortgagee upon default and foreclosure is usually necessary to prevent
forfeiture of his collateral at a price far below its true value. In most instances
the mortgagee-purchaser awaits the time when through private negotiation
it becomes feasible to realize an amount approximating the size of his claim
31. The grantee of mortgaged premises takes no greater or differcnt interest from
that of his grantor, and takes subject to the mortgage and the covenants therein. Mc-
Conihe v. Fales, 107 N. Y. 404, 14 N. E. 295 (1'7S7) ; Schooley v. Romain, 31 NMd. 574
(1869).
32. As pointed out by the dissent in the principal case, "... the mortgagor is in-
capable of subsequently creating any subordinate encumbrance that vill not be extin-
guished by an exercise of the power of sale. Courts have generally so held w here the
junior encumbrance is a mortgage." See Micn. Caw.. L.ws (1929) § 14434; Srvarthout
v. Shields, 185 Mlich. 427, 152 N. W. 202 (1915). A purchaser at a sale conducted pur-
suant to exercise of the power takes the mortgagor's title divested of all en&hmbrances
made since the creation of the power. See 3 joN-Es, MoRTrAGEs (1928) 975.
33. Trust Co. of Texas v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 683 (S. D. Tex. 1933); Min-
nesota fut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 47 F. (2d) 942 (N. D. Tex. 1931). In WVin-
ston-Salem v. Powell Paving Co., 7 F. Supp. 424 (M. D. N. C. 1934), the federal income
tax lien was, in this respect, likened in legal effect to a private mortgage.
34. Ormsbee v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 926 (S. D. Fla. 1928) ; Sherwood v. United
States. 5 F. (2d) 991 (E. D. N. Y. 1925) ; see Oden v. United States, 33 F. 12d) 553
(W. D. La. 1929).
35. Czieslik v. Burnet, 57 F. (2d) 715 (E. D. N. Y. 1932). See also KI.A, FEP-
ERAL I.Ncoln TAX.ATION (1929) 1487. However, consent to be named party defendant in
state or federal foreclosure proceedings has been given by the Government, subject to cer-
tain restrictions. 46 STAT. 1528, 1529 (1931), 28 U. S. C. §§901-906 (1934), as amended,
47 STAT. 158 (1932), 28 U. S. C. §901 (1934), as amended, 49 ST.T. 1921 (193fi), 28
U. S. C. § 901 (Supp. 1938).
36. "Under no circumstances could the alleged lien confer rights superior to the
rights of the tax-payer." United States v. Steele, 394 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. 9707
(N. D. N. Y. 1939). There is no inconsistency between this proposition and the principle
that "a lien once filed shall continue." Even though the lien continues, it is of nto avail
if the property rights covered thereby have disappeared. Ibid.
37. The efficacy of the power of sale as a form of security has long heen recomnized.
See 3 JoNTEs.,MoRTGAGE (1928) 786 et scq. Its vulnerability to abuse, however, has led
to regulatory legislation, which has been adopted in Michigan. 21 Mwut. SrTr. A:.--.
(Henderson, 1936) §§27.1221-27, 1240.
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and thereupon effects a sale. But if the property is clouded with a federal
lien, it is impossible for purchasers to prophesy the extent to which claims of
the Government may be satisfied out of the specific property in the future.38
Hence, there is no reasonable basis for making an offer; and, for all practical
purposes, the mortgagee-purchaser is forced either to await foreclosure by
the Government or, under the court's view, submit the property for sale by
judicial decree. In either case expediency and the value of private negotiation
to effectuate sale at a fair price are lost to the mortgagee.
On the other hand, tax debtors would incur substantial benefits at the
expense of the mortgagee. Although his tax debt is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy,3 9 the impecunious mortgagor would enjoy the possibility of its
satisfaction without detriment to himself. Such payment would accrue from
property, proceeds from the sale of which have already once been available
to both the mortgagor and the Government, and in which the tax debtor
retains no color of legal interest.
Apart from apparent injustice visited upon mortgagees who have made
loans on the basis of existing property law, economic implications of the
decision may have some future importance. To the extent that the power
of sale has been impaired as a desirable form of security, it is to be expected
that lenders will be more reluctant to lend and borrowers will find it more
difficult and expensive to borrow. No advantages to the tax-collection system
commensurate with the disadvantages to existing mortgagees and future mort-
gagors can be spelled out of the holding. Mere difference of opinion as to
the validity of the position earlier taken by lower courts, 40 not founded upon
significant practical considerations, does not seem to be adequate justification
for overthrowing a well-defined principle.
THE NEW YORK RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES- DESIRABILITY OF
AN ALTERNATIVE PERIOD OF YEARS*
THE attempt of New York to render the rule against perpetuities, 1y
legislative modification, "simple, uniform and intelligent"' has resulted in
more than a century of confusion. Instead of preserving only the common
law rule with respect to remoteness of vesting, the New York Law Revisers
in 1828 redefined the rule in the terms of suspension of the absolute power
of alienation and reduced the permissible period during which alienation
could be suspended from any number of lives in being to two lives in being
at the creation of the interest, with elimination of the twenty-one year period
38. See KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN (1929) 1527.
39. 42 STAT. 354 (1922), 11 U. S. C. §35 (1934), as amended, 52 STAT, 851 (1938),
11 U. S. C. § 35 (Supp. 1938).
40. See note 20 supra.
*Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 24 N. E. (2d) 322 (1939).
1. Notes of the Revisers, 3 N. Y. REV. STAT. (2d ed. 1836) 570.
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in gross.2 As a result, judicial refinements and fictions have been devised to
circumvent this strict statutory scheme so that reasonable desires of decedents
for the disposition of their property would not be frustrated in New York
when sustainable under common law perpetuity principles.3
But, as indicated by a recent case,4 irrational technicalities of the statute and
its judicial refinements, although affording to the ingenious many of the
possible dispositions available at common law, are such that unwary draftsmen
and confused courts alike are frequently ensnared. Testatrix provided that
her two individual executors should have a period of two years in which to
make diligent search for her lost nephew, or, if he pruved to be dead, his
children. The residue of her estate was given to a corporate trustee with direc-
tions to pay the nephew, in the event he was found, so much of the income
during his life as the trustee deemed proper for his maintenance and upon
his death to divide the fund equally among his children But in the event
that the executors in two years could not ascertain the whereabouts of the
nephew, the provisions for payments to him were not binding and the trustee
was to dispose of the fund for the recognized charitable purpose rf building
a hospital. Upon the expiration of two years without discovery nf the nephew
or his children, the executors accounted and were discharged upon payment
of the residue to the corporate trustee. Thereafter, two distributees of testa-
trix, contending that both gifts were invalid, sought a construction of the will.
The Court of Appeals, though paying lip-service to the maxim that "courts
are vigilant in protecting gifts to charity," held that both gifts remained
contingent for two years, that thereby the vesting was kept in "abeyance" for
a period not necessarily measured by two lives in being. and that therefore
both gifts were invalid.
.Alough not without some legal precedent, a decision based on so strict
an interpretation of the statute appears unduly harsh. The basic policy of the
rule against perpetuities is not offended by the limitation in question. The
purpose of prohibitions against perpetuities is to thwart the tying up of
economic interests in unascertained persons.- Opposition is offered by prop-
2. N. Y. RAL Paop. LAw § 42; N. Y. Prs. Pop. LAw § 11. These sections allow
the permissible period to include minorities in some situations. It would appear that the
remoteness of vesting rule was read into the statute by judicial decision. Matter of
Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909); Walker Y. Marcellus & Otisco L. Ry.,
226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E. 736 (1919). But contrary lower court decisions cast doubt
upon this proposition. See N. Y. LAw RvsxoN Corf. REP., N. Y. L ois. Dem 65 H
(1936) 74.
3. See N. Y. LAw RmIsio- Com-mr. RFP.. op. cit. mtpra note 2, at 5, 85 Ct $cq.
4. Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 24 N. E. (2d) 322 (1939).
5. In the event the nephew predeceased the testatrix, upon the discovery of his
children, the trustees were to pay them the income until all the children reached tvwent'-
one. Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 545, 24 N. E. (2d) 32, 324 (1939).
6. Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 549, 24 N. E. (2d) 322, 325 (1Q39). The court in
holding that both gifts were void for remoteness gave strength to the view that the
common law remoteness of vesting rule is to le deemed a part of the New York statute.
See note 2 supra.
7. See Comment (1927) 27 CoL L. REv. 959. This present policy underlying the
rule differs from the original purpose that property should not be withdrawn over-long
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erty owners who naturally desire to control the devolution of their possessions
after death.8 The balance between these antagonistic forces is struck by the
perpetuity period, which in England, after long experience, was restricted to
lives in being and twenty-one yearsY The New York Revisers, attempting
to weight the balance in favor of free alienability, curtailed the period to
two lives. 10 But actuarial statistics show that this aim was only partially
achieved, for the difference between multiple lives and two lives is not
great." The elimination of the added twenty-one years, however, did in fact
reduce the period. But one of the vital results of this revision was the destruc-
tion of dispositions dependent upon a contingency limited only by years.
12
This legislative modification, by destroying such gifts, produced results not
in accord with the policy fostering the statute. Dispositions of this type, as
exemplified by the will in the instant case, are necessary and reasonable in
certain circumstances. They would have been valid at common law, and
if the power of alienation may properly be suspended for two lives, it surely
may be suspended for two years.13 Even in New York, had the draftsman
of the will limited the contingency by two lives, the. gift would have been
valid.' 4 The statute, then, by destroying such dispositions penalizes poor
draftsmenship only, and does not reflect any basic policy against such interests.
A strong effort, therefore, might well have been made to uphold this will,
even under the New York statute. By an extension of a device already adopted
by the New York courts -utilizing strangers to the gift for the measuring
lives - this could have been accomplished. The lives of trustees may be
employed to sustain an otherwise invalid trust, although generally to employ
such lives there must be express designation or clear implication.'8 Here
the necessary implication was afforded by the fact that search was to be made
from commercial channels. See WALSH, FuTuRE ESTATES IN N w Yoim (1931) § 16;
Rundell, The Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation (1921) 19 Micni. L.
REv. 235.
8. See Comment (1938) 12 So. CALIF. L. Ray. 64.
9. GRAY, TnE RULE AGAINST PmRPErUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 169-199.
10. N. Y. LAw REVsioN Com. REP., op. cit. supra note 2, at 54.
11. Russell, Proposed Changes in The New York Rule Against Perpcluies (1931)
6 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 50, 59.
12. McGuire v. McGuire, 80 App. Div. 63, 80 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1903);
Matter of Wilber, 122 Misc. 472, 202 N. Y. Supp. 760 (Surr. Ct. 1923) ; N. Y. LAW
RmISioN Comm. REP., op. cit. supra note 2, at 82; Legis. (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 701.
13. See Fraser, The Rides Against Restraints on Alienation and Against Suspension
of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 185, 309;
Turrentine, Suggestions for Revision of Provisions of the California Civil Code Regard-
ing Future Interests (1932) 21 CAF. L. REv. 1, 17.
14. See note 15 infra.
15. Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 421 (1884). This case developed the
"natural term" concept whereby the trust terminates upon the death of the designated
strangers or upon expiration of the specified period whichever first occurs. The doctrine
has been extended to sustain trusts where there was no express designation of measuring
lives. Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296 (1922); Provost v. Provost,
70 N. Y. 141 (1877); Kahn v. Tierney, 135 App. Div. 897, 120 N. Y. Supp. 663 (2d
Dep't 1909), aff'd, 201 N. Y. 516, 94 N. E. 1095 (1911). But see Matter of Harrison,
152 Misc. 234, 273 N. Y. Supp. 981 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
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by two named executors and the contingency could have been deemed limited
by their lives or two years, whichever terminated first. The whole disposition,
then, could have been upheld. The criticism of this doctrine, that the same
technique could be applied to any disposition, is not as serious as first appears,
for had the will itself designated these lives the limitation would have been
valid. The careless omission should not be penalized by invalidating the entire
will, and resort to a fiction of this nature would be consistent with other
efforts of courts to alleviate the harshness of the elimination of the period in
gross from the permissible period.'
Another approach by which the present disposition could have been par-
tially upheld is afforded by judicial authority elsewhere recognized by the
Court of Appeals. The testatrix's scheme takes the form of alternative gifts,
with that to the nephew and his children quite clearly contingent upon their
discovery.' 7 Due to the indecisive language of the document, the gift for
the hospital might well have been labelled either contingent or vested subject
to being divested.18 Authority exists for either position, where an alternative
gift is provided upon the non-fulfillment within specified years of the condi-
tions to the first gift. The background for the instant decision was afforded
by Rose v. Rose,'9 relied upon by the Court of Appeals,20 where it was held
that the second limitation was contingent. Apparently the court rejected the
argument that the second alternative gift was vested subject to being divested
by the fulfillment of the conditions of the first gift, owing to its reluctance
to enter the battle then raging concerning the validity of charitable trusts in
New York.21 Despite the doubtful authority of the Rose case, it has set a
fashion that has had some adherence.
22
16. E.g., Where a trust is set up for life of beneficiary or specified years whichever
last occurs, the courts empunge the invalid provisions for years, and sustain the trust for
life. Davis v. Mfaclahon, 161 App. Div. 458, 146 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1st Dep't 1914),
aff'd, 214 N. . 614, 108 N. E. 1092 (1915) ; Cohen v. Wacht, 137 Misc. 679, 244 N. Y.
Supp. 274 (Sup. Ct 1930). See N. Y. LAw Rxvisiozr Co- n. REP., op. cit. mspra note 2,
at 85 et seq.
17. The testatrix prefaces her directions for life income to the nephew by "in event
my trustee can find" him. Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 545, 24 N. E. (2d) 322, 323
(1939).
18. Iatter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 545, 24 N. E. (2d) 322, 324 (1939). See note 26
infra.
19. 4 Abb. App. Dec. 108 (N. Y. 1863). A will provided that if the executors could
incorporate a charitable association and collect funds of a specified amount from other
sources, the residue should go to the charitable corporation; but if this could not be
accomplished in five years, the residue was to go in part to a named charity, capable of
taking, and in part to trustees to be used for such charitable purposes as they deemed
proper.
20. Matter of Roe, 281 N. Y. 541, 549, 24 N. E. (2d) 322, 32-5 (1939).
21. Rose v. Rose, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 10S, 112 (N. Y. 1863). At that time charitable
trusts were not valid in New York and were later recognized only after legislative
action. See ScoT. THE LAW oF TRusTs (1939) § 348.3; Comment (1939) 49 Yx.z
L. J. 303, 307.
22. Matter of Wood, 55 Hun. 204, 7 N. Y. Supp. S36 (1st Dep't 1SS9), af'd, 119
N. Y. 660, 24 N. E. 852 (1890) ; Matter of Simmons, 163 Misc. 415, 297 N. Y. Supp. 85
(Surr. Ct. 1937).
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On the other hand, with the happy faculty of overlooking the Rose case
and its following, another group of decisions developed, directly opposed
in principle, holding that since the first gift, limited only by years, was invalid
and could be so determined at the testator's death, the other gift vested im-
mediately in the named charity.2 3 This reasoning has been extended from
these cases where all interests are deemed to vest indefeasibly at the testator's
death, to a case almost identical to the instant case where the second alternative
gift was deemed to be vested subject to being divested by a contingency
properly limited.
24
Although these two groups of cases are direct opposites in both principle
and result, they may possibly be reconciled. The crux of the distinction is
said to be the intention of the testator.2 r Actually, however, in these situa-
tions where the language of the will affords no satisfactory indication, inten-
tion must be constructed, not construed.2 0 The test appears to be the extent
to which the disposition resulting from the application of one or the other
label will approximate the desired disposition of the decedent.2 1 Under the
instant decision, by construing both gifts as contingent the residue went by
intestacy, thus completely defeating testatrix's intention. By adopting the
other analysis - that the gift to trustees for the benefit of the hospital vested
in the trustees at the testatrix's death, subject to being divested by the dis-
covery of the nephew and subject to future possession- this charitable gift
could not have violated the rule against suspension of alienation. 28 The only
perpetuity problem then remaining would have been the validity of the divest-
23. Cruikshank v. Chase, 113 N. Y. 337, 21 N. E. 64 (1889) ; Washburn v. Acome,
74 Misc. 301, 131 N. Y. Supp. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1911), aff'd, 151 App. Div. 948, 136 N. Y.
Supp. 1150 (3d Dep't 1912) ; Matter of Berry, 154 App. Div. 509, 139 N. Y. Supp. 186
(1st Dep't 1913), aff'd, 209 N. Y. 540, 102 N. E. 1099 (1913).
24. After a life estate for his wife, testator provided one fourth of the residue should
go to his lost brother or his descendants if found within one year, but if not found, to
named charities. The gift to the charities was called vested subject to being divested by
the discovery of the brother within one year, but the gift to his descendants was void
for remoteness. Matter of Herts, 165 Misc. 738. 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 528 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
See note 30 infra.
25. See Matter of Herts, 165 Misc. 738, 743, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 528, 533 (Surr. Ct.
1937) ; Matter of Simmons, 163 Misc. 415, 417, 297 N. Y. Supp. 85, 87 (Surr. Ct. 1937)
UNDERnILL, Law OF WILLS (1900) § 509.
26. The language of the instant will is a perfect example. To become legally in-
telligible the disposition had to be reconstructed. The court was too literal in seizing
upon a few phrases as evidences of intent to make the charitable gift contingent.
27. In Matter of Simmons, 163 Misc. 415, 297 N. Y. Supp. 85 (Surr. Ct. 1937)
the refusal of the Surrogate to hold the second alternative gift vested subject to being
divested appears to be his desire to limit participation in residue to blood nieces and
nephews in preference to nieces and nephew by blood and marriage.
28. Matter of Hicks, 221 App. Div. 378, 223 N. Y. Supp. 295 (Sup. Ct. 1927);
Matter of Potts, 205 App. Div. 147, 199 N. Y. Supp. 880 (3d Dep't 1923). However,
there would be a violation of the rule against accumulations with regard to the income
accumulated for the two year period. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 63; N. Y. PERS. PRor.
LAw § 11. The income undisposed of would fall to the trustees for the benefit of the
charity. Matter of Spitz, 129 Misc. 78, 220 N. Y. Supp. 816 (Surr. Ct. 1927); cf. St.
John v. Andrews Inst., 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981 (1908).
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mng gifts. If the nephew had been found, his life estate would have been valid,
because he would be a life in being at the testatrix's death. -5 Were he found,
the remainders to his children would vest at the same time and be valid.
If the nephew, however, predeceased the testatrix or was not found before
his death, the gift of the remainders to his children might be invalid, because
they might possibly vest after two lives in being.Y° If actual facts rather than
possibilities were considered by the court, even this gift might be sustained.3 '
But assuming the invalidity of the bequest to the nephew's children, the
question comes down to whether testatrix would desire the gifts to the nephew
and the charity to be sustained or the whole disposition defeated."2 Since
the two year period had actually elapsed without discovery of either the
nephew or his children - all that the testatrix desired - it would seem most
consistent with the decedent's expressed intention to permit the residue to
fall to charity. The New York courts have constantly stated the policy of the
law as favoring vested interests and they have gone to great extremes in
labelling interests vested which in other states would be deemed contingent.
With this possible disposition before the court supported by authority and
affording the closest approximation of the testatrix's intent, the decision in
the instant case is open to challenge.
The ultimate solution of the problem produced by the principal case, how-
ever, is not to be found in the invention of further fictions. Such a develop-
ment only increases the complexity surrounding the New York perpetuity
provisions. If sound policy indicates that such dispositions should be sus-
tained, the statute threatening their validity should be changed rather than
retained only to be circumvented. This could be accomplished by the passage
29. Hatfield v. Sneden, 54 N. Y. 2,0 (1873): Matter oof Herts, 165 Misc. 733,
1 N. Y. S. (2d) 528 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
30. Since at testatrix's death there is no possibility of knowing how many children
the nephew has, the gift to them may possibly vest after tvo lives. Matter of Hets,
165 Misc. 738, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 528 (Surr. Ct. 1937). The hypothetical possibilities by
which this limitation might unduly delay vesting are so fantastic that the adviability of
employing the executors' lives to sustain these harmless gifts is apparent.
31. Where a provision for alternative gifts is made and some may be valid and some
invalid, the courts will await the event to see if a valid interest will arise. N. Y. Livr
REvisiox Comn. REP., op. cit. supra note 2, at 106.
32. A possible justification for sending the residue by intestacy in this situation is
the slight possibility that the nephew's children would be entitled to a part as testatrix's
heirs. Their share could be turned over to the court. N. Y. Sumor.vwEs' CT. Acr (Gil-
bert-Bliss, 1937) §§ 272-273. It would be kept for them until perstsns next entitled could
by presumption or fact prove them dead. Matter of Feehan, 145 Misc. 837, 261 X. Y.
Supp. 239 (Surr. Ct. 1932); ,VoEnxsa. A-.sEmcLx LAw or ArAoD!,,asTMTiN5oT ; (3d ed.
1923) § 460. This would be but a slim possibility in these situations and there vas no
indication of such an eventuality in the instant case.
33. Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 91 (1881) ; Matter of Banker, 223 App. Div.
496, 228 N. Y. Supp. 522 (2d Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 596, 162 N. E. 539 (1928).
The courts have shown great leniency in deeming gifts to charitable corporations to be
organized vested from the date of the testator's death. Matter of Potts, 205 App. Div.
147, 199 N. Y. Supp. 880 (3d Dep't 1923); In re Duprea, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 555 (Sur.
Ct 1938) ; see (1923) 37 H.,Rv. L. RFv. 275.
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of an amendment providing for an alternative period of years within which
interests could vest and during which the power of alienation could be sus-
pended.3 4 But legislative amendment of the future interest provisions of the
New York statute, notwithstanding the fact that many changes have been
strongly urged, has failed of success because of objections to any variants on
the established order, and because to accomplish most of the advocated changes,
a complete overhauling of the provisions is required.A5 To effectuate this mass
modification, further investigation may be required.30 Meanwhile, however,
enactment of the proposed amendment seems highly desirable, for it could be
done without complete revision, and the basic objections raised to other sug-
gested changes would not apply with equal force.37 Such an amendment would
prevent the destruction of interests which do not offend the fundamental policy
of prohibitions against perpetuities and which now may be sustained only by
some judicial fiction which, lamentably, courts, as in the instant case, are
frequently unwilling to apply.
INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS AND THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX*
AN effective system of estate taxation should include within its scope the
means for taxing substitutes for testamentary or intestate dispositions. In
attempting to make such provision, the federal estate tax statutes have laid
a tax on inter vivos transfers which were intended "to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death."' In applying this clause, courts have
required both an inter vivos transfer in the conveyancing sense of the word
and a "transfer" at the death of the transferor of some legal interest which
34. The proposed period should approximate what actuarial statistics indicate is the
actual duration of the average two lives period which is about nineteen years. N. Y.
LAW REvisIoN Com. REP., op. cit. supra note 2, at 9. But even a period of ten years
would cure most of the dispositions now destroyed. See Goddard, A Proposed Perpetuity
Statute (1924) 3 MicH. S. B. J. 114; Walsh, The Report of the Foley Commission (1933)
10 N. Y. U. L. Q. R~v. 495.
35. See Powell, The So-Called Ride in New York State Against Perpctuitics (1931)
3 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'z J. 91; Russell, supra note 11, at 50; Walsh, Indestructible
Trusts and Perpetuities in New York (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1211; Whiteside, Suspcn.sion
of the Power of Alienation in New York (1927) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 31, 167.
36. N. Y. LAw RMsIoN Com. REP., op. cit. supra note 2, at 8.
37. The principal objection to any change in the permissible period stems from the
fact that all trusts for payment of income are made spendthrift trusts by New York
statute, and, therefore, any extension of the period would lengthen the time during which
funds could be tied up. A provision for an alternative period in gross, however, would
not be subject to this criticism. See N. Y. LAW REvis oN COMm. REP., op. cit. supra
note 2, at 7; Fraser, supra note 13, at 185; Legis. (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 701.
* Helvering v. Hallock, 60 Sup. Ct. 444 (U. S. 1940).
1. This provision has appeared in identical form in the first federal estate tax, Rev-
enue Act of 1916, § 202(b), and all subsequent statutes. It presently is incorporated in
INT. REV. CODE § 811(c) (1939).
was reserved in the property transferred inter vivos.2 The latter "transfer"
was deemed necessary because it was felt that this tax should apply only if
the shifting of economic benefits would not be completed until the death
of the transferor.3 The use of principles of property law as criteria of whether
there has been a "transfer" at death has resulted in an exemption of certain
inter vivos transfers from the estate tax, notwithstanding that the grantor
effected a testamentary disposition by making the grantee's complete pos-
session and enjoyment of the property conditional upon the death of the
grantor.
This fact is graphically illustrated by the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Helvering v. Hallock," where decisions of five years'
standing were swept aside on the ground that they were erroneous appli-
cations of the "recondite learning of ancient property law" to the prag-
matic problems of taxation.5 In the Hallock case, a trust was created by
the decedent to continue so long as his wife should live. The income there-
from was to be paid to his wife and the corpus was to return to him at her
death, with provisions for the paymrent of the principal to his children if he
did not survive the life tenant. The settlor predeceased his wife, and at his
death the Government attempted to tax the corpus of the trust as part of
his gross estate. Two leading authorities were relied on by the litigants.
In the one invoked by the Government, Klein v. United States,0 the transfer
was to A for life, remainder to the grantor, but if the grantor predeceased
A, then remainder to A (or to others). Because the "death of the grantor
was the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate
into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the
living," the transfer was taxed under Section 402(c) of the Revenue Act
of 1918 as one intended to take effect at death. 7 The taxpayer, on the other
hand, attempted to bring the transaction within the ambit of the St. Louds
2. The judicial requirement of a second "transfer" is probably due to two factors.
By seizing on the transfer concept, the courts were able to avoid holding the estate ta
a direct tax on the property itself, contrary to the constitutional prohibition against direct
taxation without apportionment. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 L. S. 41 (110) ; New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (1921). Also the amount of gross estate is de-
termined by the value of the property transferred inter vivos at the death of the trans-
feror. Ixr. REv. CODE § 811 (1939). It should be noted, however, that a lien for the
amount of the tax attaches to the property in the hands of the transferee. I.. R. C ,nz
§87(b) (1939).
3. Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929); Reineche v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929); see Surrey and Aronson, Inter 1ir'vos Transfers a:d
the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 Coi. L. REv. 1332, 1333 et seq.
4. 60 Sup. Ct 444 (U. S. 1940).
5. See Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935) ; Becker v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935). The compelling need for clarification for-
tified the Court when it overcame the obstacle of a well-entrenched stare decisis. See
dissenting opinion of 'Mr. Justice Roberts in Helvering v. Hallock, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 453
(U. S. 1940). A further difficulty was the conformation of the Treasury Regulations to
the St. Louis Trust Co. cases. U. S. Treas. Reg. S0, Art. 17.
6. 283 U. S. 231 (1931).
7. Id. at 234.
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Trust Company cases," in which transfers in trust to A for life remainder
to A (or to others), but if the grantor survived A then remainder to grantor,
were held not taxable under the corresponding section of the Revenue Act
of 1924, because the grantor retained nothing save "a mere possibility of
reverter" that ceased at.the grantor's death with no power to resume owner-
ship, possession or enjoyment except upon a condition subsequent independent
of the volition of the grantor. The rationale of these last decisions was that
a vested remainder constituted a present interest which took effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at the time of the conveyance and not at the decease
of the grantor, and, therefore, was not subject to a death duty. In both
the Klein and St. Louis Trust Company cases, however, the grantees would
receive the property free of all restrictions only if they were living at the
death of their respective grantors; the event of death in each case finally
determining what course the property would take. By couching the transfer
in terms of a vested remainder subject to divestment, instead of contingent
remainder, the conveyancers in the St. Louis Trust Company cases created
the equivalent economic interests of those in the Klein case and at the same
time escaped the estate tax. In Helvering v. Hallock, the Court rejected these
tenuous distinctions between vested and contingent remainders as tests of
whether a certain inter vivos transfer was intended to take the place of a
testamentary disposition.) Since it was evident that there was no factual
difference between the effect of the transfers included in the Klein and St.
Louis Trust Company cases, the Court refused to elaborate the distinction
with additional refinements by casting its decision on either side of the line
drawn by the former decisions. Rather it was held that the trust property
should be included in the gross estate because of the provision for the rever-
sion of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable only at his
death.10 Neither the character of the interest transferred inter vivos n nor
the likelihood that the stated contingency might occur 12 were considered
8. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.. 296 U. S. 39 (1935) ; Becker v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935).
9. The distinctions are presently useful to determine problems unrelated to taxation
such as alienability, remoteness, and destructibility. See (1936) 49 H.Rv. L. REv. 42.
10. Taxpayers who have this reversion in existing indentures are now faced with
intricate valuation problems. Since a common provision is to have the taxes paid out
of the residuary estate, the settlor will wish to dispose of his reversion in order to avoid
an unexpected (train on the gift to the probable natural objects of his bounty. A convey-
ance of the reversion would be subject to gift tax. But if made in contemplation of
death, would the entire corpus be taxable? If not, only the inconsequential value of the
reversion would be taxed.
11. The reversion on a contingent remainder in fee is one of the slightest possible
interests in property, although it does have the dignity of an estate. See Sumsts, FUTtwii
IxTERESTS (1936) § 75; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 332.
12. In each trust involved in the Hallock case, the contingency of reversion to the
settlor depended upon the predecease of a living adult. There was thus no necessity for
the court to deal with the remoteness of the contingency. The "propinquity" of a similar
contingency was, however, a decisive factor in the income tax field. See Genevieve F.
Moore, 39 B. T. A. 808, 811 (1939) ; cf. In re Terry, 218 N. Y. 218, 112 N. E. 031
(1916) (succession tax on grantee of a possibility of reverter postponed until grantee
[ Vol. 491120
by the Court; instead it based its decision on the fact that the conditional
character of the transfer was akin to a testamentary disposition. It is al:o
significant that the Court did not await possible amendatory legislation to
fill the lacuna in Government revenue made by the discarded -cae .
The approach taken by the Supreme Court forecasts a reexamination of
the requisites for a taxable transfer. A significant effect of the decision in
Helverhig v. Hallock may be the extension of the scope of retroactive appli-
cation of state inheritance taxes. Unlike the federal estate tax on the privilege
to transfer property at death, state succession taxes are inip-ed on the
grantee's privilege to receive property.13 A succession tax may thus hw
imposed retroactively when the grantor's decease occurred after the passate
of the tax statute if new interests accrue at that time to the transferce." It
was held in Coolidge v. Long,'5 however, that under the Constitution a vtzt.il
remainder subject to divestment was exempt from a subsequently Inactt 4
succession tax because the remainderman received his entire interest at thlik
time of the conveyance. But in Binncy v. Long,(1 the retroactive tax.-tion
of a contingent remainder was permitted on the ground that the lteneficiary
did not receive the full economic benefit of the transfer until the death of
the grantor. Since Hclvcring v. Hallock has expressly discarded this vcti-A-
contingent distinction - because on the predecease of the grantor the ce'oml-
plete dominion over the interest of a grantee of a vested remainder condi-
tional on survivorship is established - it appears that the taxation of vested
remainders under subsequently enacted state inheritance tax -tatutc( will
henceforth be permissible.
The repercussions of the Hallock case may also have far-reaching Qff ct¢
on the taxation of the proceeds of life insurance policies. A divided Court
in Binghamn v. United Statcs17 held that policies taken out before the statute
specifically included a tax on life insurance proceeds were exempt, because
the tax should not be retroactively applied, and also fnr the reasozn that
the right of reversion to the insured of power over the proceeds"' upon the
predecease of the assignee of those powers was not an interest that pasod
comes into possession because of remoteness of ontingency). Althsugh the flaf, ,:
holding may not apply where the revernion of the settlor is extremely unlltaly tvi bap:-n.
it is significant that the court made no reference t-. this ouetirn. It ha! kel ,
somewhat impractically, however, that the fact .f reservation indlictcs tOat the comtin-
gency was valuable to the transferor and should therefore fie taxed. Surrocy and Ar,?-
son. supra note 3. at 1336.
13. The distinctions betw cen the two systems of taxatk n are eilaintAl fully in Gtn.%-
SON- AND OTIS. INHERITAncE TAx.ro% (4th ed. 1025) 2-6.
14. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 269 (1028); 'ee Inds.1 Pay in the
Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax (1936) 22 VA. L. Ritv. 2od.
15. 282 U. S. 582 (1931).
16. 299 U. S. 280 (1936): eCf. Wright v. Blakeqlce. 101 U. S. 174 OS70".
17. 296 U. S. 211 (1935). relyhzn an Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 V. S. 23' N(O25). Mr.
Justices Brandeis. Stone and Cardozo concurred on the first ground stated in the text
18. If these powers had not been assigned, the proceeds n~ould probably have kcn
taxable. See Reinecke v. Northern Trut Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1920): Chaqe Nat. r-a!:
v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929) (power to change hbneficiaries); Porter v.
Comm'r, 288 U. S. 436 (1933) (power to change beneficiaries except in favor of insured).
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at death. Since the Court was unanimous in a simultaneous decision 19 which
involved similar policies but did not mention the absence of an interest at
death, it seems that the scope of the Hallock decision will probably be con-
fined to insurance policies created after the enactment of the pertinent estate
tax provision where the assigned powers may revert to the insured. 20 Al-
though technical distinctions may be made between a reversion on a vested
or contingent remainder in fee and the right of reversion of powers assigned
over insurance policies, an extension of Helvering v. Hallock will probably
recognize that the latter reversionary interest is one that passes at death.
In both instances the death of the transferor and of the insured are deter-
minative factors in the final disposition of the property transferred inter
vivos and of the insurance proceeds.
21
Helvering v. Hallock may also provide the impetus for a new attack by
the Government on the rule established by May v. Heiner22 in 1930, and
later confirmed in 1931 by three per curiam decisions, 23 that the reservation
of a life estate to the grantor with remainders over is not a taxable transfer.
That rule is based on the rationale that the remainderman's interest was
established by the original trust deed, and no interest passed at death. But
because the Supreme Court construed the amendment, 24 enacted in 1931
to remedy this situation, as permitting prospective application only, 25 inter
vivos transfers reserving a life estate made prior to 1931 are not subject
to an estate tax. Even if a technical "transfer" was deemed essential at the
time of the per curiam decisions, adequate authority was then available to
bring the transaction ruled upon within this requirement. In Tyler v. United
States,26 the Court permitted the full value of a tenancy by the entirety to
be included within the decedent's estate, although the tenancy could not be
encumbered or destroyed by one tenant without the consent of the other,
19. Industrial Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 220 (1935).
20. Cf. Paul, Life Insurance and The Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HARV. L. Ruv.
1037.
21. This result was reached without reliance on the possibility of reverter present
in the policies in Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl. 1939), modified, 30 F.
Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1939). See (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 126.
22. 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
23. McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931); Morseman v. Burner, 283 U. S.
783 (1931) ; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (1931).
24. The amendment was enacted by the Joint Resolution of Congress, 46 STAT, 1516
(1931), 26 U. S. C. § 411(c), on the day following the decisions. It seems clear that
Congress believed the existing statute provided for this transaction. See 74 CoNr. Rme.
7078, 7198 (1931). The majority of similarly worded state inheritance taxes were con-
strued against the taxpayers on this question before lay v. Heiner. Rottschaefer, Taxa-
tion of Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at Grantor's Dealth
(1930) 14 Minx. L. REv. 453, 482 et seq.
25. Hassett v. Velch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938). The prospective application was up-
held in Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 (1938). Although Congress apparently in-
tended the amendment to operate prospectively only, this should not deter an adjudication
that May v. Heiner misconstrued the existing statute and, therefore, the amendment was
actually unnecessary.
26. 281 U. S. 497 (1930).
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and despite the fact that the interest of the decedent lapsed at his death.?
The remainderman's coming into possession at the death of the life tenant
is surely as significant a shift of the economic benefits in the property as
obtains upon the receipt by the surviving tenant of the exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the tenancy. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged
taxability when the only interest retained was a power to revoke a transfer
in trust.23 The cessation of the possibility that the transferee's interest would
be revoked was held sufficient basis for the tax, but this power to revoke
was terminated by the death of the transferor. It appears, therefore, that
when the per curiam decisions were decided, the requisites of a transfer at
the death of the grantor were satisfied, if there was either an increase in
the survivor's interest in the property, or if the survivor was relieved from
the possibility that his interest would be diminished. The Court's refusal in
the per curiam decisions to apply the principles established by this authority
was probably due to its immediate concern with the technical property con-
siderations involved in a life estate with remainders over, in place of a factual
analysis of whether the inter vivos transfer is a substitute for a testamentary
gift. The requisites for a "transfer" at death are satisfied in Helvering -.
Hallock if the fulfillment of the grantee's interest is conditional upon the
death of the grantor. The decease of the life tenant determines when the
remainderman will receive the actual enjoyment of the proceeds of the
property, while the termination of the reversion on a contingent remainder
in fee merely makes previously existing enjoyment more certain.- Since
the Halock case held that the latter event swept the entire corpus into the
decedent's estate, it would seem to follow that the theory upon which May
v. Heiner rests- that the reservation of an interest in property (as dis-
tinguished from power of control over a trust res) which lapses at the
grantor's death prevents taxability because no interest can then pass at death
to the transferee- has been interred. It thus appears that the exempted
status of the life estate interests created prior to the 1931 amendment is
open to reconsideration.30
Finally, the fact that the scant legal interest reserved in the Halloch case
was sufficient basis for the estate tax suggests that the time is approaching
when an inter vivos transfer may be taxable even though no legal interest
27. The full value of both a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy may b2
included in the gross estate although the tenancies were created prior to the passage of
the first federal estate tax. Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 287 L. S. 577 (19r),
aff'g per curiam, 58 F. (2d) 1085 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932), 45 F. (2d) 911 (D. Mass.
1930); United States v. Jacobs, 305 U. S. 363 (1939); see PAUL, STrCDns I FEmmrL
T.AXATIO., (1937) 35.
28. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
29. The fact that the valuation of the remainder depends upon the expectancy of the
life tenant would appear irrelevant. Even if the value of the remainder equals the full
value of the property upon the life tenant's reaching or passing his expectancy, the trans-
feror retains a significant feature of property-use and possession-until his death.
30. The obstacle of stare decisis to a disaffirmance of the principle of 3ay v. Hch:er
would be less severe than the one facing the court in the Hallod2 case. Reliance on 3May
v. Heiner is confined to a period of eight and one-half months, uhile the St. Louis Trust
Co. cases were in effect for five years.
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whatsoever is reserved at the time of the transfer, so long as complete do-
minion over the property is not attained by the beneficiaries until after the
death of the transferor. 31 A shifting of economic interests from the trans-
feror at his death would thus be necessary only when the original transfer
preceded the enactment of the statute, in order to overcome objections to
retroactive taxation.32 The opportunity for a direct decision on this question
may come from what will probably be the taxpayers' last stand, an irre-
vocable transfer in trust (with no power reserved to alter, amend, or ter-
minate) to accumulate income, and at or after the settlor's death, distribution
of the corpus to be made in accordance with the terms of the trust.33 If the
statute means exactly what it says, such an inter vivos transfer would be
included. 34 On its face, Section 302(c),'5 which provides for the tax on inter
vivos transfers intended to take effect at death, does not require a second
"transfer" at the taxpayer's death. It is significant that provision for a tax
on any interest retained by the decedent at his death is specifically made in
a separate section.3" The courts might well recognize that one objective of
the estate tax is to subject all property to a death duty once in a generation. 7
By proceeding from this premise, Section 302(c) can be construed as a classi-
fication by the legislature of inter vivos transfers intended to take effect at
death in the same category as testamentary dispositions.38 That a "transfer"
at death would then be unnecessary may be seen from the Supreme Court's
approval of the subjection of gifts made in contemplation of death to an
31. W hen a gift tax is paid on a trust which subsequently hy judicial decision be-
comes subject to an estate tax. the question arises whether a credit for the gift would be
allowed when the statute of limitations has run against the period permitted for refunds.
See INT. REv. CODE §§813, 910 (1939).
32. See Helvering v. Helmlolz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935) ; White v. Poor, 296 U. S. 98
(1935).
33. A similar trust was held invalid in Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545 (1927), on
the ground that no interest remained in the decedent. Although the termination of the
trust was not conditional upon the settlor's death, he was 57 years of age with an ex-
pectancy of 16 years when the trust was created, and it was to remain in effect for 30
years. Referring to this decision, the Court in Reinecke v. United States, 278 U. S. 330,
347 (1929), stated that the transfer did take effect at death but was not so intended. In
view of tie fact that the settlor inevitably realized that he would predecease the ter-
mination of the trust, a contrary conclusion seemts inescapable.
34. This trust would, of course, be void at the outset when in violation of state stat-
utes against accumulations. However, in the 13 states having such statutes, the majority
permit accumulations for the life of the grantor, and some limit the restriction to realty.
The statutes are collected in SIMEs, FUTURE INTERFSTS (1936) §591. An alternative
last stand might be to .4 for the life of the settlor, corpus to B at the settlor's death.
Since B's possession or enjoyment would not take effect until the settlor's death, this con-
veyance involves the same considerations as the trust set forth in the text.
35. Ixr. R v. CODE (1939) §811(c); Revenue Act of 1926, as amended.
36. Ixr. REv. CODE (1939) § 811 (a); Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(a), as amended.
37. See GLEASON AND OTIS, INHERITANCE TAXATION (4th ed. 1925) 9.
38. This was, of course, the purpose for including inter vivos within the original
estate tax. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 31. But the judicial construction has so
hedged the statute with the concept of a "transfer" at death, that the genesis of the pro-
vision seems forgotten. See note 2 supra.
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estate tax, although the absence of any transfer at death, technical or other-
wise, is obvious. 39 This construction would confirm the further objective
of Congress to classify transactions in a manner which will prevent avoidance
of the Government's duties. The courts have granted Congress an increasing
freedom to achieve this purpose40 so long as the classification is reasonable.4'
The future significance of the necessity of a "transfer" of an interest at death
appears to depend, therefore, upon whether the suggested construction would
satisfy the judicial requirements for a reasonable classification.
EFFECT OF JUDGMENT IN PRIOR CLASS SUIT*
GENERALLY a court of equity will not proceed unless all persons whose
interests will be directly affected by any decree are before it as parties to
the proceeding.' But the chancellors marked out an exception at an early
date: when such persons are virtually represented by others who are actually
parties, the court will proceed in their absence, provided their interests are
sufficiently similar to those of their representatives to insure adequate pro-
tection.2 The doctrine was founded in the discretion of the chancellors-
exercised with reference to necessity, convenience and a desire to avoid a
multiplicity of suits, rather than by the application of a rigid rule.3 Although
the class suit doctrine was retained in the state codes of civil procedure,
an unfortunate choice of language 4 coupled with rigid and technical inter-
39. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 20 (1931) ; United States v. 'Vells, 283
U. S. 102 (1931).
40. See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933) (income from irrevocable trust taxed
to the grantor when use of trust income is for his benefit).
41. See Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297, 301 (1938); Hevering v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 92 (1935), rehcaring denicd, 296 U. S. 664 (1935);
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 679 (1933). Cf. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
* Lee et al. v. Hansberry ct al.. 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (Ill. Dec. 13, 1939).
1. STORY, CommENTARmS o,, Egurry PLEADINGS (9th ed. 1879) § 72. The same
principle applies to the one form of action authorized by the codes. CLAnm, CoDa P AD-
ING (1928) 250.
2. Although the "class suit" is the most common instance of the application of this
exception, the doctrine has been used in many other situations. 1 FR. L..:, LAw C r.
JuDxGnssxrs (1925) § 435. Thus decisions in'cases involving contingent interests in real
estate, usually of persons not in being, may bind absent parties if they were "virtually"
represented by others actually before the court. Longworth v. Duff, 297 Ill. 479, 139
N. E. 690 (1921). McCampbell v. 'Mason, 151 Ill. 50D, 38 N. E. 672 (1894).
3. See CLARK, CODE PLEDING '(1928) 280; Blume, Class Suits and Jurisdictional
Amount (1931) 15 1E1N. L. REzv. 501, 523; Comment (1922) 36 -LAnv. L. REv. S9, 93.
4. The New York provision, a typical e-xample, is as follows: "When the question
is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." N. Y. Civ. PRae. AcT § 195. It has ben
impossible to administer together the two criteria set up in the statute. Posnmov, Coz
REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 286. Hence some courts have interpreted the whole section
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pretation decreased the flexibility of the rule. Furthermore, the problem
of the effect of judgments in class suits on absent members of the class has
proved troublesome.6 The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in their
provisions for class suits,7 mark a trend toward greater flexibility in the
use of the device, but the implications of the Rules with reference to the
effect of judgments in representative suits may involve an unfortunate rigidity
not warranted by either policy or authority.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois has presented these
problems in sharp relief.8 Five hundred owners of real estate in a residential
section of Chicago entered into a restrictive covenant forbidding the use or
ownership of their premises by negroes, the covenant to be effective when
signed by the owners of ninety-five per cent of the frontage involved. In
a previous action brought by one Olive Burke "on behalf of herself and all
other property owners in the district covered and affected by the agreement,"
the court enjoined negro use of certain premises, the parties having stipu-
lated that the owners of ninety-five per cent of the frontage had signed the
agreement. 9 In the present action, plaintiffs sued to enjoin certain property
owners subject to the restrictions, not defendants in the previous suit, from
violating the agreement. The trial court found that defendants' allegation
that the owners of only fifty-four per cent of the frontage had signed the
agreement was true, but held that since the question of due execution had
been decided in the previous suit, it was now res judicata, and the injunction
should be granted.10 On appeal, the Supreme Court, with two judges dis-
senting,11 affirmed, holding that since the previous action was a proper class
suit, the judgment bound all members of the class represented.12
Although the plaintiff in the prior suit could have brought an individual
action to protect her interest,'3 the representative suit on behalf of herself
as merely an attempt to restate the equity rule. McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb. 516
(N. Y. 1851). The language of the statute was probably derived from Mr. Justice Story's
work on equity pleading, published in 1838. See Fleming v. Mershon, 36 Iowa 413, 417
(1873).
5. See Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Rep-
resentative Suits (1932) 30 MIcH'. L. REV. 878; Wheaton, Representative Suits Ivolv-
ing Numerous Litigants (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 399.
6. See ARNOLD AND JAMES, CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS (1936) 175.
7. FED. RULES CIV. PROC. 23. For a discussion of the new rule, see 2 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2219-2303.
8. Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (Ill. 1939).
9. Burke v. Kleiman, 277 I1. App. 519 (1934). The covenant is set forth in full in
the opinion.
10. See Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N. E. (2d) 37, 39 (Ill. 1939).
11. The dissent in the principal case was motivated largely by the possibility of
fraud opened up by the opinion of the majority. Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N. E. (2d) 37, 41
(II1. 1939).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. It seems well-settled that any owner who is a proper party in interest may bring
an action to enforce such restrictive agreements. See DeGray v. Monmouth Beach Club
House Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388 (Ch. 1892) ; Calvert v. Bradley, 16 How. 580
(U. S. 1853); 14 Am. JUR., COVENANTS (1938) § 345; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928)
242, n. 1; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1441, 1446. The covenant involved
[Vol, 491126
and all others affected by the agreement was quite proper.'4 The members
of the class were too numerous to be conveniently joined in one suit, had
a common interest in the enforcement of the restrictions imposed by the
agreement, and if separate suits for injunctions were brought, common ques-
tions of law and fact would be presented which might be more expeditiously
settled in one action provided adequate protection of the interests of absent
parties was afforded. The prior class suit was equally proper in jurisdictions
which permit such representative actions only when all the parties, but for
their number, might have joined as litigants 15 - even in states which adhere
to the provisions of the earlier codes narrowly restricting the right of several
persons to join as plaintiffs or defendants. 10
Whether the court was correct in ruling that the prior suit was res judicata
as to the question of due execution of the agreement is a more perplexing
problem. It is generally said that a former adjudication binds only parties
who were adverse in interest in that action,17 though they may have been
nominally on the same side.' 8 Since the defendants were not the same in
both suits, a decision that defendants in the second action are bound by the
prior adjudication must rest solely on their membership in the class repre-
sented by plaintiffs in the first suit enforcing the covenant. But the interests
of the parties in the second action were not adversary in character in the
prior representative suit -they were all members of the same class.10 Indeed,
if their interests had been adversary, no class could have existed. Since the
present defendants had no notice of the first suit,20 no issues could have been
actually litigated between them and the rest of their class in the first action.
Hence it would seem the court was in error in holding the defendants bound
in the principal case expressly provided that the promises of the parties were to be sev-
eral in character. See Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, 523. 524, 527 (1934).
14. Early decisions deny that a class suit for an injunction may be brought in this
situation. Marselis v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 31 (Ch. 1830). But
more recent decisions hold that class actions may be appropriate even though any member
of the class might have sued in his own right. 2 M\ooRE'S FEDMRL PRACTIcE (193S) 2241.
But a class action for damages for breach of the covenant probably would not be per-
mitted. See Blume, supra note 5, at 883.
15. See cases cited in PoyFROY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 289. Pomeroy's rule is criti-
cized by Blume, supra note 5, at 89S.
16. CLARK, CODE PLFAXnDIG (1928) 252. Some states, among them Illinois and New
York, have revised the earlier code provisions, and permit joinder whenever a "common
question of law or fact" is presented. HARROW'S ILLINOIS PIUCTICE 1,ANuA. (1936) 34
et seq. Neither state adheres to the Pomeroy rule determining when a class suit may be
brought. Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (Ill. 1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee
& Trust Co., 276 N. Y. 230, 11 N. E. (2d) 890 (1937). Hence the expansion of per-
missive joinder has not operated to enlarge the scope of the class suits device in those
states.
17. 1 FRxEA., op. cit. supra note 2, § 422.
18. Id. § 423.
19. It might be argued that defendants in the principal case were not members of
the class in the prior suit, because their interest in asserting that the agreement had not
been properly executed was not represented in that litigation. If this viewpoint were ac-
cepted, res judicata could not, of course, be applied in the present action.
20. Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N. E. (2d) 37, 41 (Ill. 1939).
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by the prior adjudication.2' It is true that contract rights between the mem-
bers of the class in the first suit were dependent on the existence of similar
rights against their common adversaries in that proceeding,22 but in the
absence of notice of any litigation, application of that principle as a reason
for holding the judgment binding on the present defendants seems grossly
inequitable.
But even when it is conceded that a restrictive agreement may be the
subject of a class action, and the adversary interest rule is disregarded, the
propriety of the court's decision may be challenged. The authors of the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not include a statement of the effect
of judgments in class suits. The Rules define three types of representative
actions, based on whether the character of the right sought to be enforced
for or against the class is (1) joint, common or secondary, (2) several, and
the action concerns claims to specific property, or (3) several, and there
is a common question of law or fact and a common relief is sought.2 3 Actions
falling in the third category, called "spurious class suits," include those,
like the representative suit involved in Lee v. Hansberry, in which each
member of the class might have sued alone.24 An authoritative commentator,
declaring that the types of class actions distinguished in the Rules were
defined with reference to the problem of res judicata, has drafted a rule
declaring that judgments in suits of the third type should bind only the
parties actually before the court.2 r The application of this rule would pro-
duce a result contrary to the decision in the principal case. Of course, the
Federal Rules do not apply to state cases, but since the question of the effect
of judgments in class suits is substantive in character, 20 the rule suggested
for the federal courts may be appropriately considered in discussing the
propriety of a state decision.
To the extent that the analysis of the problem of res judicata in class
actions made in the Federal Rules recognizes that differences in result may
be reached depending on the character of the action, it seems more closely
in accord with the policy and authorities supporting the doctrine, than the
frequent grouping of all class actions in one category, with the assertion that
the judgment binds all concerned.2 7 But by relating the effect of the judgment
21. No cases precisely in point have been found; the argument is based on applica-
tion of the principles stated.
22. In some cases it has been held that where the rights of co-plaintiffs are dependent
on their rights against their common adversary, the judgment adjudicating the latter is
conclusive in a subsequent litigation between the co-plaintiffs. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Haggart, 163 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) ; 1 FREEAIAN, op. cit. supra note 2,
§§ 425, 426. No case has been found extending that principle to members of a plaintiff
class without notice of the suit.
23. For illustrations of the three types, see NOTES TO TIHE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 22; 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE (1938) 2235-2245.
24. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2241.
25. Id. at 2283, 2294.
26. Id. at 2283.
27. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Buckley, 85 Miss. 713, 38 So. 104 (1905);
PomERoY, op. cit. mipra note 4, § 296; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 282.
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solely to the question whether one member of the class might have sued
alone, other factors relevant in any discussion of res judicata may not be
given their proper weight.2s In this respect, it seems that the proposed rule,
particularly if applied in states with rigid provisions for joinder, may lead
to toleration of repeated adjudications unjustified by the broad policy of
res judicata. 29 Thus if an individual A sues X on behalf of the members of
class A, any one of whom might have sued X in his own right, and X gets
a judgment in his favor, the members of class A would not be precluded
from suing X individually on the same cause of action.30 But this rigid rule,
presumably without exceptions, does not seem justified by the decisions or
by public policy. An examination of the decisions indicates that the binding
character of the judgment has in fact depended on the circumstances of
each case.31 Thus, in the absence of fraud, members of the class have been
barred by a plea of res judicata in a subsequent suit, when they had ade-
quate notice of the class action and an opportunity to join in its prosecution.
No cases have been found where a member of the class who had notice of
the action has been permitted to evade a judgment against the class. A
contrary rule tends to defeat the purposes of equity in permitting a class
suit-to make a settlement in one action of common questions of law and
fact among many litigants, avoid a multiplicity of individual claims and relieve
the burden of the courts.33 However, in some federal cases, there may be
28. See Blume, Class Sits and Jurisdictional Amount (1931) 15 M::. L Ray.
501, 523.
29. For a general discussion of the policy of res judicata, see Von Moschzislzer,
Res Judicata (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 299.
30. Of course, those who appear on behalf of the class may not relitigate the came
issues against the same defendants. See note 25 supra.
31. Thus, in the following cases, the fact that absent members of the class had no
notice of the suit was an important factor in holding them not bound: Wabash Ry. v.
Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38 (1907) ; Towle v. Donnell, 49 F. (2d) 49 (C. C.A. 6th,
1931) ; Ayer v. Kemper, 48 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; First Nat. Bank v. Edwards, 134 S. C. 348,
132 S. B. 824 (1926). And see also PomEReoy, op. cit. supra note 4, §296; Blume supra
note 5, at 897. But in other cases, special circumstances may justify a decision that the
judgment is binding on members of the class without notice. Thus, where a public rather
than a private right is involved, the judgment is binding. Vabash Ry. v. Koenig, 274
Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; McIntosh -. Pittsburgh, 112 Fed. 705 (C. C. W.% D. Pa.
1901); Tallassee v. State ex rel Brunson, 206 Ala. 169, 89 So. 514 (1921). Similar
problems are discussed in Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax Cases (1937) 46 YA.E
L. J. 1320; Comment (1926) 26 CoL- L. REv. 191. One writer has distinguished class
suits involving property or a fund, in which the judgment should be binding, from other
class actions, in which the judgment should not bind absent members of the class, regard-
less of notice. 1 SnzEE'r, Exurrx PRAcrxcE (1909) §§ 547-552. But this distinction is
not in accord with the decisions.
32. See cases cited in note 31 supra.
33. Cf. ARNoLD AND JAMEs, CASES ox TRIALS, JUDGMEN,MS AND ArPx'n.s (1936)
175, 176. In 2 Mfooit's FEDERAL PRacric (1938) 2294, the author, criticizing the notice
rule, says: "Such an 'analysis' seems, at most, to be relegating the entire doctrine to the
haphazardous concept of 'fireside equity.' Only confusion has resulted from such a
criterion!'
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more justification for declaring that the judgment in a "spurious" class suit
should not bind absent members in any event. Where that type of action
has been allowed to permit absent persons to take advantage of the federal
diversity jurisdiction available to others with a common interest, whose
residence permits them to be parties, 4 there may be less emphasis on finally
settling the issues as to all members of the class. But in state courts the
class suit is designed solely to end controversy, and, properly, the impact
of res judicata has not been relaxed as to parties with notice of the action.
Since the defendants in Lee v. Hansberry had no notice of the previous
adjudication, 35 the decision that they are bound by that decree is clearly
ill-advised, on the basis of the reasoning above. Furthermore, the question
of due execution by the owners of ninety-five per cent of the frontage in-
volved was never actively contested in the previous case; the parties stipulated
that the proper number had signed and centered their controversy on other
issues.8 6 In ordinary actions, decisions of issues stipulated are no less binding
than those of issues contested, 37 but a different rule seems justifiable with
respect to absent parties in a class suit. The result in the principal case is
not only inequitable and unwarranted by authority; it presents a dangerous
opportunity, through collusive litigation, to destroy the rights of parties not
before the court.
MARRIAGE BY ESTOPPEL IN NEW YORK*
NEW YORK courts have long been uncertain about the effect to be accorded
a foreign divorce decree granted against a person domiciled in New York
who has neither appeared in the foreign proceeding, nor been personally served
in that jurisdiction.1 The divorce is said to be void,2 so that the rights and
responsibilities incident to the marital relation are unaffected,8 and a second
marriage contracted in New York is a nullity.4 However, to meet the com-
34. See Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924); Acken v. N. Y. Title & Mortgage Co., 9 F. Supp. 521 (N. D. N. Y. 1934);
2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrIcE (1938) 2301.
35. See note 20 supra.
36. The only issue litigated in the previous class action was whether the court
should refuse to enforce the covenant because many violations had been tolerated. Burke
v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, 531 (1934).
37. See Von Moschzisker, supra note 29, at 323. There are a few dicta suggesting
a different result. Ibid.
* Krause v. Krause, N. Y. Ct. of Appeals, Mar. 12, 1940.
1. Greene, The Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce Decree in New York (1926) 11
CORN. L. Q. 141; STU1.BERG, CONFLIcr OF LAWS (1937) 276, 277; Notes (1936) 45 YAI.E
L. J. 1292, (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1359.
2. See Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933) ; Stevens v. Stev-
ens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. (2d) 26 (1937).
3. Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 628, 15 N. E. 333 (1888); Williams v. Williams, 130
N. Y. 193, 29 N. E. 98 (1891).
4. A person who remarried in New York State would be indictable for bigamy.
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 340; People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879).
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plications arising from the remarriage of one of the spouses, the courts have
accorded certain operative effect to the "void" decree. The party who sought
and obtained the foreign divorce is held to be estopped to question the validity
of the decree. This doctrine may effect a change in the legal interests of
the parties under either the first or the second marriage. A wife who secures
an invalid divorce and remarries may not claim dower from her first hus-
band,' nor may a husband who procures such a divorce avoid fulfillment of
a contract "dependent" on the validity of the remarriage."
The estoppel doctrine has been most solicitously invoked, liowever, in favor
of the wife of a second marriage.7 Because her interest is in conflict with
the New York policy in favor of upholding the status quo of the first mar-
riage, the scope of the relief granted has been strictly confined. In the first
place, the estoppel is allowed to operate only against the moving party in
the divorce proceedings.8 As against any other person in a second marriage,
relief is not granted even after years of cohabitation or the birth of children.0
Nor will an inducement of the invalid divorce and second marriage by an
avowal of their validity which approaches fraud make the husband liable
for support.' 0 The inequity of such holdings is apparent. The application of
the estoppel doctrine is made to depend on the accident of which of the
parties to the second marriage is compelled to seek "affirmative relief.""
In the second place, the estoppel doctrine -,vas limited as to the type of
action to which it could be applied. Actions by a "second wife" on contracts
for separation allowance or inheritance were allowed on the theory that they
were "private claims" involving property rights against the husband per-
sonally- 2 But statutory actions for legal separation with support, which were
conceived as based on a duty imposed by the marital relationship, could be
5. Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903).
6. Brown v. Brown, 266 N. Y. 532, 195 X. E. 186 (1935) (contract for support);
Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612, 7 N. E. (2d) 719 (1937) (con-
tract of dower).
7. Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933) ; see Harper, The Myth
of the Void Divorce (1935) 2 LAW & CON.TMP. Pon. 335, 339.
8. See Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 60 (1930) (inducer of di-
vorce and second marriage not estopped) ; Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 X. Y. 131, 183 N. E.
279 (1933) (inducer of divorce and remarriage not estopped though thirteen years co-
habitation).
9. Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 183 N. E. 279 (1933) (thirteen years co-
habitation) ; Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657, 18 N. E. (2d) 301 (1939) (child barn, yet
husband granted annulment from invalidly divorced wife).
10. See Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933) : and Lefferts v.
Lefferts, 243 App. Div. 278, 280, 276 N. Y. Supp. 809, 811 (1st Dep't 1935) (action for
fraud fails because no confidential relation shown between the "second husband" and in-
validly divorced wife about to marry upon the "second husband's" inducement).
11. Compare Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930) (no estoppFl
in behalf of procurer though induced to procure), with Brown v. Brown, 266 X. Y. 532,
195 N. E. 186 (1935) (procurer estopped to deny validity of "void" divorce and remar-
riage in contract action "dependent" on valid remarriage).
12. Brown v. Brown, 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935) (contract of support);
Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612, 7 N. E. (2d) 719 t1937) (con-
tract of dower). See Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. (2d) 26 (1937).
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brought only by a lawfully wedded spouse. 13 Later cases demonstrated the
tenuous nature of this distinction. A contract duty of support was enforce-
able although "dependent" on the marital status. 14 It would seem to be no
more alarming to use the same procedural device of estoppel to establish
marriage for purposes of the statutory duty of support.
This was the position taken by the Court of Appeals in a recent case. A
husband "remarried" after procuring an invalid Reno divorce. Six years
later the couple separated, and the wife sued for a limited divorce with support.
The husband pleaded, by way of affirmative defense, that the statutory pre-
requisite to such an action was lacking, since his void divorce precluded his
contracting a second valid marriage. A motion to strike this defense was
granted in the lower court, and this ruling was affirmed by both the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals.' 8
Thus the Court of Appeals has eliminated the illogical distinction between
the application of the estoppel doctrine to suits based on contract and those
based on statutory duty. The language of the opinion indicates that further
liberalization of the doctrine may be expected. It is true that the court restates
the old limitation of the doctrine to the situation in which the party estopped
is the procurer of the divorce. But the court's decision seems to have been
strongly influenced by a feeling that ". . . it is not open to the defendant
in these proceedings to avoid the responsibility which he voluntarily incurred."
The court seems to have moved away from the emphasis in the older cases
on penalizing the defendant's attempt to evade the strict New York rule by
seeking a foreign judgment,' 6 toward a predominant concern with doing
justice to the plaintiff.17 The court even suggests that a marriage ceremony
conceded to be invalid may give rise to obligations which the state is interested
to uphold.' 8 The court is of course not asserting that an invalid ceremony
13. Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. E. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930) ; see Stevens v. Stevens,
273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. (2d) 26 (1937).
14. Brown v. Brown, 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935).
15. Krause v. Krause, N. Y. Ct. of Appeals, Mar. 12, 1940, aff'g, 256 App. Div.
906, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 237 (1st Dep't 1939). The same result, on similar facts, was
reached in Stevely v. Stevely, 254 App. Div. 743, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 69 (2d Dep't 1938).
16. The first estoppel case denied a claim for dower by the procuring wife who re-
married and had a family. The court considered her conduct "repugnant to [the court's]
sense of propriety." Matter of Swayles, 60 App. Div. 599, 601, 70 N. Y. Supp. 220, 221,
aff'd, 172 N. Y. 651, 65 N. E. 1122 (1901). The habitual observation that the denial of
a defense or claim to a procuring party is not a "true estoppel" has continued ever since.
See Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y.'503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903) ; Krause v, Krause, N. Y.
Ct. of Appeals, Mar. 12, 1940. The understanding seems to be that the bar is against
the procurer rather than in favor of second marriage parties.
17. The majority opinion by Finch, J., states: "The result which we reach here is
the only one which awards justice to the plaintiff . . ." In point of need the plaintiff
parallels any abandoned spouse whether of a first or second marriage. Krause v. Krause,
N. Y. Ct. of Appeals, Mar. 12, 1940.
18. The court writes: "Thus there is complete observance of not only the interest
of the state in the protection of the first marriage, but also of the other interest of the
state that marriage obligations should not be lightly undertaken or lightly discarded."
Early in the opinion the court makes the reference: "The . . .marriage between plaintiff
and defendant was void . . . But none the less plaintiff and defendant participated in a
[Vol. 491132
can give rise to a legally valid marriage; the legal relations under the first
marriage remain untouched. The state's interest would seem to be equally
compelling, and the equitable position of the wife of the second marriage
equally strong, whether or not the defendant happens to be the procurer of
the invalid foreign decree.
It is therefore possible that the Court of Appeals may pursue further the
reasoning of the instant case and apply the estoppel doctrine to cases in which
the defendant is not the procurer of the divorce. Such a step would provide
an authoritative articulation of a doctrine toward which the lower courts
have been groping. Persons other than the procurer of the invalid divorce
have been held liable for support when they induced the divorce and remar-
riage.19 This recognition of new rights under the second marriage is not
made at the expense of the spouse under the first marriage. She is entitled
to a declaration of status,20 to support prior in right to that of the second
wife2 1 and to the statutory right of inheritance. The New York policy in
support of legal interests under the first marriage is therefore not violated
by the enforcement, through the estoppel technique, of interests incident to a
second invalid marriage.
The instant case permits the second "wife" to enforce against her spouse,
previously the procurer of an invalid divorce, her statutory right of support.
As such, it reflects a disposition on the part of the court to recognize with
greater realism the relations which actually existed between the parties to
the second "marriage."
complete marriage ceremony . . ." This ritual, the court elsewhere concludes, gives to
the defendant husband "responsibility which he voluntarily incurred. ' At another place,
the court speaks of the husband's position as an "attempt to disown any legal obligation
to support the plaintiff."
19. Campbell v. Campbell. 164 fisc. 647, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 619 (Dom. Rd. Ct.
1937) ; Carbone v. Carbone, 166 fisc. 924, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 869 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 193S);
see Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1501.
20. Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1928).
21. See Krause v. Krause, N. Y. Ct. of Appeals, Mar. 12, 1940. Hitherto no dei-
sion of priority was necessary for the first wife had the sole claim to support.
22. N. Y. Dc. EsT. LAw § 18. The estoppel rationale applied to support is equally
applicable to a suit for statutory inheritance.
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